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ABSTRACT 
 
Until recently, international relations theory has treated the territorial state as a transhistorical 
constant.  The post-positivist turn, however, revives the question of the state’s origins and future 
sustainability.  By drawing together the contributions of historical sociologists and social 
theorists of war, this thesis provides a model for change in political organization stemming from 
foundational transformations in warfare.  This model considers not only warfighting practices, 
but the social and broader historical context in which war is embedded.  Through analysis of the 
feudal and modern cases, I demonstrate why warfare is the best lens through which to evaluate 
change in political organization. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein 
the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known:  and therefore the notion of time is to 
be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of weather. 
 
      -Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
 
The body politic, as well as the human body, begins to die as soon as it is born, and 
carries in itself the causes of its destruction. 
 
      -Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 
 
On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero. 
 
      -Chuck Palahniuk, Fight Club 
 
 
The conduct of war and peace, polities and their politics, is a story of deep and dramatic change.  
What history strongly suggests yet is loath to argue, however, is that every epoch has an 
expiration date.  The easy decree that we have reached the end of history, that our current form 
of politics will reign eternal, can be seen across time and space, from Thomas More’s 1509 
description of the coronation of King Henry as the “the everlasting glory of our time”, with a 
sovereign who will bring about a “golden age”, to John Donne’s 1626 proclamation that “I was 
borne in the last age of the world”, to G.W.F. Hegel’s 1806 statement that Napoleon’s victory at 
the Battle of Jena constituted a dialectical overcoming and the end of history, and finally to 
Francis Fukuyama’s 1991 argument that liberal democracy constitutes the “end point of 
mankind’s ideological evolution”.1   From inside a given historical epoch, it is difficult to see the 
vast revolution potentially lurking behind each technological innovation and every social or 
tactical shift.  As we examine the patterns of massive change in political organization across time 
                                                 
1
 These quotes come from, in order, Walker (2005, 9); Silver (1998, 55); Kojeve (1969, 44) and Fukuyama (1991, 
xi). 
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and space, two questions immediately come to mind.  Why does political organization suddenly 
restructure itself around a new form of order?  What is the course of such a development? 
 The answers to these two fundamental questions in the literature have largely centered 
around two ontologically divided fields of inquiry.  The first focuses on the material aims and 
drives of political organization; namely, how the state attempts to secure resources and maximize 
its relative power vis-à-vis other actors.  The second focuses on the ideational realm, with social 
determinations and ideal visions of the world constituting the basis for political organization.  
What is absent in both of these accounts, however, is a transhistorical ontological bridge to join 
the objects of both studies.  It is my contention that war, understood beyond the direct conduct of 
combat operations as a social and historical phenomenon, provides an essential bridge between 
ideational and material approaches.  As a result, I contend that any theory of change aimed at 
bridging this ontological gap ought to use a broad concept of warfare as the central theoretical 
principle.  While we cannot trace a determinate path of political development across time and 
space, we can theorize a developmental relationship between the transition to new modes of 
warfare and the subsequent rise of new political units.  Using Fernand Braudel’s three temporal 
spheres as a conceptual template, I set Robert Gilpin’s ‘interaction change’, ‘systemic change’ 
and ‘systems change’ against Andrew Latham’s ‘warfighting paradigm’, ‘social mode of 
warfare’, and ‘historical structure of war’.  With each situated change in warfare, I argue for a 
necessary change in political organization at the same temporal level, and the possibility for 
political transformation at the next, more foundational, temporal speed. 
 Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of the broad literature on state formation and political 
transformation.  I begin with an examination of the political scientific literature on state 
formation, beginning with the school of thought centered on the anarchy problematique, 
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considering both neorealist approaches and critical anarchy-centered scholarship.  I then move to 
a discussion of the Constructivist school, beginning with more general models of social 
epistemology and finishing with Hall’s specific social developmental model.  Finally, I consider 
neo-Marxist international relations scholarship, conceptually unpacking approaches concerning 
the social division of labor and social property relations.  The discussion then shifts to three 
approaches grounded in the historical sociological tradition.  I start by analyzing the 
commercialization model, in both its causally determinate and indeterminate varieties.  Analysis 
then shifts to the geopolitical competition model, which emphasizes the role of the technologies 
of war on the development of states and capitalism.  Finally, I examine Martin Shaw’s globality 
thesis, which focuses on the role of global revolution and the transformation towards a global 
consciousness.  I conclude by arguing that the literature at large suffers from three major 
problems—an overdetermination of change in variables that can never obtain universal historical 
veracity, an inability to identify and account for the antagonisms underpinning political 
transformation, and an inadequate account of warfare as a unique social phenomenon. 
Chapter 2 attempts to rectify these theoretical errors by establishing the fundamental 
basis for my theoretical model.  To that end, I establish the ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological elements of my thesis in some detail.  The chapter begins by explicating the 
ontological basis of my theory, both elucidating the dual objects of inquiry (war and political 
organization) and establishing how I will situate their change vis-à-vis other fundamental actors 
and processes.  I then establish the epistemological basis of my theory, laying out the conceptual 
and definitional basis for the state, war, and revolution.  Third, I lay out the foundational 
methodology of my theory, drawing connections between Gilpin three modes of political 
transformation and Latham’s three modes of warfare, establishing the two modalities of change 
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that motivate my thesis.  Finally, I answer potential criticisms of my method and demonstrate 
why an analysis of warfare provides the best avenue to analyze political transformation. 
Chapter 3 launches a plausibility probe of my thesis focusing on two broad cases, one 
historical and one contemporary, in order to both demonstrate the applicability of my thesis 
broadly and to elucidate the implications that changes in the modality of warfare have on 
political organization both within and across temporal layers.  I begin by looking at changes in 
the feudal warfighting paradigm; specifically, the technological developments related to the 
emergence of gunpowder, mobile capital ships and the artillery fortress and the tactical 
development toward an infantry-driven force posture.  These innovations are then 
developmentally linked to transformation in interaction strategies pursued by different polities 
and change within the systemic organization of political actors across the continent.  Next, I 
examine how the feudal transition away from ad hoc military structures towards standing forces 
is indicative of a shift in the social mode of warfare, investigating the interconnections between 
this transformation and the subsequent reorganization of the systemic balance of power.  Finally, 
I examine whether this social shift altered the very nature of the European system of political 
organization and the implications such a transition potentially posed for the broader political 
system.   
Moving on the modern context of war and political organization, I begin by analyzing the 
revolution in military technology away from high-yield weaponry toward crude and inexpensive 
small arms and explosives.  I then focus on the consequences this shift in the warfighting 
paradigm has had on interaction strategies, specifically examining the rise of non-state actors and 
their integration into diplomatic channels.  Moving to the consequences entailed by such a shift 
for the systemic balance of power, I argue that military devolution poses major hazards to the 
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continued exercise of global power.  Next, I examine the consequences of the shift in the conduct 
of war on the social mode of warfare, arguing that within the new war paradigm, violence is no 
longer constituted around states but rather around identity groups.  I then transition to an 
investigation of the consequences of this downward shift in the social mode of warfare on the 
systemic balance of power and the global system as a whole.  Finally, I examine the possibilities 
for a neomedieval transition to account for the changing nature of warfare. 
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CHAPTER 1 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
OVERVIEW 
Treating the state as the contingent product of political organization in one particular juncture of 
history—as opposed to a universal concept within the structure of international politics—has 
only recently become a relevant question within the discipline of political science.  International 
Relations theory as a whole, owing in large part to the conceptual hegemony of neo-realism, 
tended to focus heavily on questions of structure and largely ignored questions of agency and 
history.  Exceptions certainly existed, most notably in the studies conducted by scholars of 
historical sociology, with other important contributions coming from students of Marxism and 
World-Systems theory.  The mainstream political scientific discourse on the state as an object of 
analysis, however, treated it merely as the primary unit type within international politics, with no 
meaningful discussion of how it got there or why it should be expected to remain.  With the post-
positivist challenge to neorealism’s hold on the field and the perception that the state’s role as the 
primary form of political organization may be in question, a number of theoretical approaches 
have been advanced to explain the rise of the state and what changes we might expect in political 
organization in the near future.   
I begin with an examination of the theories of political organization that center on the 
anarchy problematique.  Here I move from Kenneth Waltz’s understanding of the state as a pre-
configured variable within the larger structure of international relations, to Robert Gilpin’s 
attempt to historicize realism through the creation of a structural systems theory, to Daniel 
Deudney’s discussion of violence interdependence and the necessity of evolutionary political 
organization, and finally to Alexander Wendt’s teleological argument for the necessity of a 
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global state.  Second, I move to an examination of theories of political organization stemming 
from a social constructivist perspective, beginning with John Ruggie’s analysis of social 
epistemes, continuing with Christian Reus-Smit’s understanding of purposive and configurative 
change, and concluding with an inspection of Rodney Bruce Hall’s argument for societal 
collective identity.  Third, I examine the neo-Marxist theories of political organization, opening 
with Justin Rosenberg’s argument that different modes of production produce different modes of 
political organization, with the modern state understood as a consequence of the rise of 
capitalism, and closing with Benno Teschke’s contention that the rise of capitalism necessitated 
transformation in social property relations, which in turn produced the subject of political 
economy.  Fourth, I examine two commercialization models:  the first advanced by Fernand 
Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, which argues that a functioning world-economy created the 
state through the demands of trade and necessity of a dominant core model, and the second 
provided by Hendrik Spruyt, which argues the varying impact of trade on different European 
regions created distinct social alliances that in turn resulted in new and unique forms of political 
organization.    Fifth, I examine the Weberian geopolitical competition models advanced by 
Charles Tilly, in which war made the state and the state made war, and Michael Mann, in which 
the competition between competing feudal holdings and subsequent resource demands drove not 
only state formation, but also the rise of capitalism itself.  Finally, I move to Martin Shaw’s 
attempt to synthesize many of these concepts around his vision of emergent globality and the 
subsequent transformations in military, economic, political, and social relations.  I conclude by 
arguing that these models lack a compelling account for the coterminous rise of the territorial 
state and the monopoly on legitimate violence, and call for a new theory that understands 
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transformation in the material and social conditions of war as the essential impetus behind 
change in political organization.  
 
THE ANARCHY PROBLEMATIQUE 
In his work Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz lays out the groundwork for a 
systemic theory of international relations.  Specifically, Waltz attempts to create a coherent and 
testable scientific system centered on the fundamental “ordering principle” of anarchy, or the 
lack of any meaningful authority capable of enforcing a collective set of rules on the totality of 
political actors (Waltz 1979, 88).2  Agents on the international stage, of which Waltz only finds 
states to be meaningful, are “functionally undifferentiated” and are only distinguished in terms of 
their capabilities (Waltz 1979, 97).  The only two logics that can ever obtain on a structural level 
are anarchy and hierarchy—consequently, because Waltz believes that hierarchy in international 
politics is impossible to achieve, anarchy is and always has been the dominant structuring 
element in the interactions between political communities.  The only changes that one can 
observe in the international system consist in the number and position of the Great Powers—the 
fundamental anarchic logic underpinning international relations is eternal and unchangeable.3  
“The logic of anarchy obtains whether the system is composed of tribes, nations, oligopolistic 
firms, or street gangs” (Waltz 1990, 37).  While the predominant political unit type matters to 
Waltz, as the way an anarchic system works depends on the constitution of its actors, 
transformations in unit type are outside of the scope of neorealism, which only concerns itself 
                                                 
2
 See Mearshimer (2001, 2007) for a similar defense of anarchy as the sole organizing principle among 
undifferentiated units. 
3
 Krasner (1993, 1995, 1999) makes a similar argument regarding the eternal nature of anarchy as an ordering 
principle, but differs with Waltz on the basis of anarchic order.  Krasner argues that since the rules of territorial 
sovereignty that supposedly underpin the international system have been frequently disregarded, we should look past 
this “sovereign illusion” and view rulers’ desire to rule as the fundamental and trans-historical root of anarchy.  
12 
with the functioning of the status quo international system.  Neorealism’s predictions are made 
exclusively in terms of its presumptive unit type, the state, under the logic of anarchy.  Instead of 
being a weakness, however, Waltz uses this seeming limitation to preempt any criticism of 
neorealism as an incomplete theory:  “Theories must be evaluated in terms of what they claim to 
explain” (Waltz 1979, 118).  Focusing on the macro-level predictive capability of neorealism, 
Waltz completely disregards any criticism that his theory of international politics precludes 
examination of either agency or history in global politics. 
 Waltz’s blatant dismissal of counter-arguments against neorealism demonstrates his 
theory’s inadequacy to provide any meaningful account of political transformation, either in the 
past or in the future.  Richard Ned Lebow has argued that Waltz’s attempt to create a seemingly 
scientific theory has “denuded […] realism of its complexity and subtlety” and represents “a 
parody of science” that “more closely resembles an unfalsifiable ideology” (Lebow 2007, 53).  
Neorealism requires an inside and an outside for its vision of the world to hold true—there must 
be a domestic, hierarchical sphere against which the anarchic international sphere operates.  As 
an examination of feudal Europe demonstrates, however, the cross-cutting and overlapping 
spheres of authority in pre-sovereign Europe represent neither neorealism’s vision of anarchy or 
hierarchy.  A wide variety of political authorities held sway, from kings, to religious officials, to 
town governments, and none of them held anything close to a monopoly of violence, not to 
mention there was no universal basis for authority (Spruyt 1994, 12).  There certainly was 
nothing resembling the territorial state, with fixed borders and a homogenous identity.  The 
national/international divide upon which the fundamental tenets of neorealism rest simply did not 
exist.  Neorealism specifically, and theories of anarchy more generally, are theoretically 
insufficient to account for such a political arrangement.  Conflating anarchy with history is 
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nothing but an empty tautology.  Instead of imposing the order of anarchy as a transhistorical 
given, we must examine the historical mode that gave rise to anarchy and its structural 
companion, the sovereign state. 
Attempting to restore the missing historical dimension to the (neo)realist research 
program, Robert Gilpin’s War and Change in International Politics tries to answer the question 
of international change through a structural systems theory.4  Traditional models of political 
change have tended to fall into one of two camps:  the liberal-democratic belief that change is an 
incremental process towards a peaceful institutional goal, and the Hegelian-Marxist belief that 
change comes in violent political upheavals aimed at resolving contradictions within the system.  
Gilpin argues that within the international system, both of these effects can be seen, with 
frequently implemented incremental change occasionally marked by major ‘economic, 
technological, or military developments’ that cause an immediate, often violent fracturing in the 
global political order (Gilpin 1981, 46).  The response to these newly developing challenges to 
the predominant social actors and practices within the global order creates the possibility of 
revolutionary change and the rapid creation of a new social reality. 
To further differentiate change in the international system, Gilpin theorizes three distinct 
forms of change, which operate at different fundamental levels and speeds (Gilpin 1981, 41).  
The first is the slowest and most rare form of change, what Gilpin calls ‘systems change’, in 
which the fundamental nature of the international system itself changes.  For Gilpin, this means a 
change in the dominant unit type in the international system—he cites empires, nation-states, and 
multinational corporations as three examples of dominant units within different historical 
periods.  The second is ‘systemic change,’ which reflects a shift in the distribution of power 
                                                 
4
 A similar attempt to historicize neorealism can be seen in Kaufman (1997).  Instead of theorizing change in a tiered 
method like Gilpin, Kaufman views history in broad strokes where the anarchy problematique actively promotes 
consolidation while economic interdependence, unit identity and administrative technology counteract such a drive. 
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within a system, but maintains the overriding logic and order within the international system.  
This form of change occurs regularly over a longer period of time and would include the rise and 
fall of empires and great powers through hegemonic war.  The final form is what Gilpin calls 
‘interaction change’, or a modification in practices and policies at the international level.  This 
form of change fundamentally alters diplomatic strategies and relations between political actors 
and happens quite frequently.  Change at the interactional level is thus incremental, because it 
doesn’t seek to change the fundamental political order, while change at the systemic and systems 
level is revolutionary because they seek to change the very constitution of the system as a whole 
(either by changing the dominant actors within a system or changing the very unit that 
constitutes an actor).  These changes operate under a rational choice model where all actors 
attempt to minimize the costs of political organization and maximize their capabilities in the 
international sphere.  The revival of trade and the Military Revolution in feudal Europe set the 
stage for political concentration and territorial sovereignty.  The nation-state thus became the 
predominant model of political organization because it “was the most efficient form of political 
organization for the set of environmental conditions that developed in early modern Europe” 
(Gilpin 1981, 116). 
Although Gilpin’s theory attempts to bring the historical dimension back in to the realist 
account of international politics, it also brings in the same universal imposition of its principles 
that doomed neorealism as a viable account for change in the global system.  Echoing Waltz, 
Gilpin ultimately concludes that “the nature of international relations has not changed 
fundamentally over the millennia” (Gilpin 1981, 211).  As a result, Gilpin’s theory of change 
reflects the same inability to explain the historical continuity between the crisis in feudal political 
organization and the emergence of the territorial state (Teschke 2003, 20; Spruyt 1994).  The 
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lack of any sort of constitutive basis within Gilpin’s theory is unfortunate—not only does the 
theory treat systems change as a result of seemingly random and largely coincidental events, but 
it also cannot account for the variety of political outcomes in different European regions.  As  
Benno Teschke argues, Gilpin’s assertation of a clear winner of the competitive pressures of the 
international order cannot be reconciled with the historical record of both variegated political 
forms in “the Dutch oligarchic merchant republic, the post-1688 British constitutional monarchy, 
the Swiss Federation, the German confederate Empire, and the Polish aristocratic republic” and 
the theory-defying examples of “the failure of certain polities, like Burgundy” alongside the 
success of smaller polities “like the German mini-absolutisms” (Teschke 2003, 22).  A final 
objection to this theoretical perspective argues that despite setting out a framework for research 
into the function of systems change, Gilpin retreats into the comfortable study of hegemonic 
balance and distribution of capabilities.  While Gilpin’s attempt at a systemic theory begins to 
move in the right direction, his inability to make a clean break with the dogmatism of neorealism 
renders his approach insufficient to properly theorize state formation. 
Daniel Deudney’s recent work Bounding Power attempts to shore up the historical 
inadequacy of in the prior realist attempts to theorize political organization.  Where Waltzian 
neorealism attempts to provide an account of global politics centered on a single governing 
factor, the anarchy problematique, for Deudney the question of what constitutes the fundamental 
source of tension internationally cannot be reduced to a single variable.  Instead, Deudney 
identifies two interrelated governing principles within international politics—the ‘anarchy-
interdependence problematique’ and the ‘hierarchy-restraint problematique’.  The anarchy-
interdependence problematique refers to the “relationship between variations in material context, 
the scope of security compatible anarchy, and the scope of authoritative government necessary 
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for security” (Deudney 2007, 28).  While this approach includes the neorealist understanding of 
the anarchy problematique, it extends beyond realism’s limited vision of security as only 
explicable through analysis of the distribution of power and instead orients its program around 
the concept of interdependence.  The hierarchy-restraint problematique, by contrast, exists 
completely outside of realism’s theoretical purview, referring to the “relationship between 
variations in the size of government needed and variations in the security viability and types of 
hierarchical and republican government” (Deudney 2007, 30).  The insight here is that because 
governments have often been the source of death and destruction, hierarchy itself can provide a 
potential security risk as dangerous as that of anarchy.   
This bifurcation of ordering principles within international politics allows Deudney to 
unite the question of political organization with the variable of ‘violence-interdependence’, or 
“the capacity of actors to do violent harm to one another” (Deudney 2007, 35).  Deudney 
contends that when violence-interdependence is absent, government itself is unnecessary and 
even impossible, while when violence-interdependence is intense and threatens individual or 
collective survival, hierarchical political forms become a necessity.  For all intensities in 
between, government is possible but not necessary, because survival is not at risk.  In this 
fashion, Deudney theorizes the difference between first anarchy (the state-of-nature in which the 
intensity of violence-interdependence and threat to individual survival demanded the creation of 
hierarchical polities) and second anarchy (the state-of-war that exists between states but doesn’t 
threaten their survival, thus making hierarchy unnecessary). 5  With advances in technology 
rendering warfare more and more deadly, however, the necessity of ever-larger hierarchical 
structures becomes a virtual necessity.  Deudney traces the technological evolution of war over 
                                                 
5
 This argument relies on Deudney’s paraphrasing of Hobbes.  Hobbes’ ‘Leviathan’ is a necessary corollary to life 
otherwise made “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” by the constant war of nature (Hobbes 1985, 186). 
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four epochs:  the pre-modern period, the early-modern period, the industrial period, and the 
nuclear period (Deudney 2007, 37-8).  As technology progresses, hierarchical political 
organization must continually widen its territorial scope in order to protect against the increased 
intensity of violence-interdependence entailed by each subsequent epoch.  As we reach the 
nuclear period, the very survival of states is called into question,6 which Deudney claims 
provides a basis for the creation of global hierarchies culminating in some form of Nuclear One-
Worldism to stave off the risks of nuclear annihilation.7 
While this theoretical framework is argued for in new language, the underlying 
conceptual framework draws very heavily on the principles of neorealism.  As Anastasia Xenias 
argues, “it is unclear how […] global-industrial material context is substantially different from 
relative capabilities, just how physiopolitics is distinct from geopolitics, […] or why hierarchy 
restraint is anything but a balance of power” (Xenias 2007, 698).  The republican security theory 
Deudney claims to elucidate seems to be nothing more than neorealism in a new guise, which 
ties his argument back to a conceptual language inadequate to the task of describing systems-
level political transformation.  Deudney’s theory does substantively advance past neorealism in 
one sense, however, by identifying the increasing destructiveness of military technology as the 
driver of change in international political organization.  This argument’s heuristic value, 
however, is undermined by its unilinear determinism.  Deudney’s argument presumes that the 
advancement of military technology, and the subsequent political forms it engenders, occurs 
exclusively in an evolutionary fashion toward more and more destructive weaponry.  While this 
                                                 
6
 The basis of this argument can be found in Herz (1957), which argues that the role of state territorial integrity was 
to maintain a “hard shell” of protection against external threat.  The nuclear age rendered this protective strategy 
functionally meaningless, which Herz concludes creates an incentive to move away traditional territorial state 
models.  For an intriguing rebuttal, see Harknett (1996), who argues that the dissuasive power of nuclear weapons 
constitutes a “soft-shell territoriality” which maintains the state as the guarantor of security through deterrence. 
7
 The discussion of nuclear one-worldism is a holdover from Deudney (1995, 1997) where he uses the standard 
Waltzian understanding of anarchy to argue for political consolidation.  This continuity in thought seems to enhance 
the argument that Deudney’s republican security theory disguises and reproduces neorealist ideology. 
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model is true in some contexts, particularly in the military development of advanced Western 
states, the actual use of military technology in the contemporary context seems to follow a 
devolutionary pattern, with small arms and munitions supplanting larger and more destructive 
weaponry, even in wars fought by those states possessing highly destructive military capabilities.  
This gap poses a major problem for Deudney’s theory—while he seems, in an argument echoing 
Fukuyama, to be proposing the end of military history, the predominant military technology in 
the contemporary context is quite technologically crude.  The underdevelopment of any 
comprehensive social understanding of warfare in favor of a unilinear narrative of advances in 
destructive capability renders Deudney’s theory of political organization both artificial and 
ahistorical. 
If Deudney’s argument is implicitly teleological, Alexander Wendt’s “Why a World State 
is Inevitable” is quite explicit in its advancement of a teleological method.  Drawing on the work 
of self-organization theorists, Wendt argues that order does not emerge merely through the 
“mechanism of mutation-selection-retention, but also ‘spontaneously’ from the channeling of 
system dynamics by structural boundary conditions toward particular end-states” (Wendt 2003, 
492).  These boundary conditions manifest in both a bottom-up and a top-down fashion.  The 
bottom-up process, which Wendt calls upward causation, is seen when the reactions of individual 
actors to local stimuli cumulatively self-organize into a coherent structure (e.g., the reactions of 
states to local threats becoming systematized in the balance of power system).  The top-down 
process, which Wendt calls downward causation, consists of the boundary conditions that act to 
maintain the function of a system by punishing those actors who threaten to destabilize its 
operation (e.g., the ability of anarchy to ‘select’ those actors who balance power and eliminate 
those who don’t).  Instead of merely providing a constrained environment for the random 
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development of actors within it, however, Wendt argues that these systems necessarily have an 
end-point toward which development is directed, a stable attractor around which the system can 
become self-perpetuating.  The evolution toward such a final cause is uneven and nonlinear, but 
static boundary constraints necessarily push systemic organization toward a pre-given end. 
Wendt argues that the boundary conditions controlling the international system consist of 
the standard variable of material conflict and the more uncommon Hegelian concept of 
recognition.  The material argument advanced by Wendt draws heavily on Deudney’s claim that 
the threat nuclear weapons pose to state survival necessitate the creation of global hierarchy.  For 
Wendt, however, a purely materialist account like Deudney’s presumes that individuals and 
actors retain static identities as rational, self-interested maximizers both prior to and after the 
creation of a global state.  To challenge this conception, Wendt complicates the discussion of 
interstate anarchy:  “I agree that people want security.  However, I think they also want 
recognition, which means that the logic of anarchy is also about a struggle for recognition” 
(Wendt 2003, 510).  It is Wendt’s contention that subjectivity and identity are rooted in 
recognition of the Self by the Other—in this way “…subjectivity depends on inter-subjectivity” 
(Wendt 2003, 511).  Wendt’s theory does not assume the primacy of the desire for recognition 
within state formation, but maintains it to be as important a constitutive factor as material 
security.  Because political subjectivity and identity are conceived of as exclusive groupings, 
individuals encounter each other from pre-determined identity boundaries, and thus “…outsiders 
are denied rights and may even be killed not because of what they have done as individuals, but 
simply because they are members of a different group” (Wendt 2003, 515).  As a result, social 
groups attempt to achieve corporate recognition vis-à-vis other groups in order to secure the 
subjectivity of their collective identity as well as the subjectivity of all constituent group 
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members.  Based on this theory of recognition, Wendt concludes that the only stable systemic 
end-state possessing universal recognition lies in a monopoly of legitimate violence held by an 
inevitable global state.8  
Although Wendt attempts to argue otherwise, it is nearly impossible to falsify the 
argument that a global state represents the stable end-point of political organization.  Stating that 
human political organization has trended towards consolidation or that computational models 
and existing states demonstrate a consistent developmental path does not provide the necessary 
evidence that the current historical juncture is at all indicative of any predictive end state.  If 
systemic selection does not follow a direct and linear path towards a fixed-point attractor, it 
seems to be an unwise leap of faith to suggest that we can see the end from inside the system.  To 
extend this point, how can one even ascertain what the boundary conditions of the system are?  
Wendt’s quick and uncritical adoption of anarchy as part of the essential character of the 
international system reflects the worst ahistorical tendencies within the neorealist tradition.  
Although Wendt attempts to argue that the boundary conditions of anarchy leave open the 
possibility for individual action, it seems clear from his conclusion that the system must 
culminate in an all-encompassing global state.  How can such a theory deal with groups that 
constitute their identities against that of a specific Other?  Should we expect generations of 
accumulated knowledge and belief to just wash away against the tide of inevitability?  Is the 
entire historical record irrelevant in the face of this theory?  Wendt’s world state hypothesis is at 
once too deterministic, too myopic, and too ahistorical to provide a meaningful motivating 
theory for political organization. 
 
                                                 
8
 For a good review of the current scholarship on global state formation, see Craig (2003) and Lu (2006).  For a 
critique arguing the global state argument is based on a bad systems theory, see Taylor (1996). 
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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
In response to the preoccupation of scholars of the anarchy problematique with the universality 
of material competition, the social constructivist school identifies the central motivation behind 
political organization as a consequence of underlying social forces.   In an article entitled 
“Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:  Toward a Neorealist Synthesis”, John 
Ruggie elucidates the constructivist position on the inadequacy of such a materially-centered 
approach.9  For Ruggie, although Waltz’s conceptual schema makes a valiant attempt to resolve 
the perennial question of how to systematize international relations, the neorealist project’s claim 
to universality flies in the face of history.  “[T]he difference between [anarchy] and the modern 
international system cannot simply be attributed to differences in the distribution of capabilities 
among their constituent units.  To do so would be historically inaccurate, and nonsensical 
besides” (Ruggie 1986, 142).   The radically different patterns of competition and cooperation in 
different geopolitical regions call into question the asserted transhistorical applicability of the 
rules of the anarchical system.10  Instead of accepting the conclusion that we must schematize 
and historicize change in international politics under the framework of anarchy, Ruggie argues 
that we must focus on non-systemic causes of change and calls for an examination of the broader 
social forces that create and recreate geopolitics.   
The organizing principle of Ruggie’s new investigation is the ‘social episteme’,11 which 
he defines as the prevailing configuration of constituent elements within a given social order.  
Transformation in political organization does not stem from changes in the material condition of 
                                                 
9
 For related arguments, see Bull (1977); Onuf (1989); Ruggie (1998b); and Wendt (1987, 1992, 1999). 
10
 Supplementing this analysis, Hobson and Sharman (2005) argue that not only is anarchy’s scope geographically 
limited, but presupposing its universality ignores the historical dimension of extant hierarchy on the international 
stage, specifically in non-sovereign imperial structures. 
11
 That this term is borrowed from Foucault (1970) is intriguing.  The Order of Things argues not only that we 
should problematize the unconscious order (economic, political, social) around which the world operates; but that 
we should also problematize the tools we use to study it.  Ruggie’s operationalization of “social episteme” seems to 
achieve the opposite effect. 
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states; instead, transformation emerges from a fundamental change in the “mental equipment that 
people drew upon in imagining and symbolizing forms of political community itself” (Ruggie 
1993, 157).  Ruggie argues that the transition between the feudal and sovereign systems of order 
was undergirded by a revolution in political doctrine and metaphysics.  Citing contemporaneous 
transformation in linguistics, art, and interpersonal sensibilities, the transition to the inter-state 
system can only be understood as a consequence of a Renaissance shift in the social 
epistemology of the subject (Ruggie 1993, 158-9).  Ruggie thus understands the emergence of 
territorial sovereignty as the consequence of understanding the spatial organization of politics 
through a single-point, egocentric perspective.  These changes did not, and quite simply could 
not, occur in a social vacuum.  The constitution of a new dominant unit in international politics 
required a new inter-subjective order involving “the mutual recognition of the new constitutive 
principle of sovereignty” (Ruggie 1993, 162).  While it is possible to account for changes within 
political organization through a purely material analysis, Ruggie argues that changes to political 
organization require fundamental social transformations that anarchy-centric approaches fail to 
account for. 
While Ruggie’s broader social account of change in international politics provides a 
reasonable explanation for many of the theoretical voids in the anarchical account, the immensity 
of such a project threatens to drown any explanatory insights in a sea of inter-subjective 
variables.  At no point does Ruggie describe how we can operationalize an account of political 
transformation from the nebulous concept of social epistemes.  Additionally, if structure is 
primarily a function of social practice as opposed to material reality, then all theory is merely 
reactionary and descriptive, or at the very least incomplete, as social agents can constantly 
reinterpret and reconstruct the international system.  Ruggie would likely respond to these 
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criticisms by arguing that when discussing transformation in political organization, we cannot 
isolate precise cause-and-effect relations and instead should adopt a model of causal 
indeterminacy.  Acceptance of non-causal theory, however, reveals two major problems with a 
focus on social epistemology.  First, an indeterminate account under-theorizes systems change 
because it cannot describe the antagonisms driving it.  As Teschke argues, it would be naïve to 
understand radical change in political order as “a series of intersubjective negotiations and 
agreements among political elites, be they domestic in origin or the result of a chain of 
international peace congresses” (Teschke 2003, 31).  Instead, fundamental transformations in 
political organization must be understood as the result of conflictual, often violent, social 
relations.  Understanding the source of these antagonisms should be one of the primary goals of a 
theory of change in political organization.  Second, this ‘indeterminate account’ paradoxically 
over-determines political change as a direct transition from the breakdown of the old order to a 
stable and fulfilled new order within the next social episteme; in this case, the direct transition 
from feudalism to the modern state system.  What this explanation ignores, however, are the 
many transitional forms of political order that bridge the gap between the former status quo and 
the eventual stable end-result of systems change.  There is no coronation for the successor to the 
old political system—instead, aspirants to the role of dominant political organizational type 
square off until one unit type emerges as most capable within the newly established order.  While 
Ruggie is correct to point out the inadequacy of the anarchical account and the need for a social 
element to systems change, his reliance on the nebulous concept of social epistemes renders his 
theory insufficient. 
 In an attempt to compensate for the theoretical inadequacy of the social episteme, 
Christian Reus-Smit’s The Moral Purpose of the State identifies the root of sovereign 
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organization not in rational egoism, but rather in social legitimation.  For Reus-Smit, the 
standard Constructivist approach to political organization massively oversimplifies both the deep 
constitutive values that underpin the social identity of the state and the principles of legitimacy 
that underpin international social organization.  Consequently, he introduces the concept of 
‘constitutional structures’ to refer to “the social identity of the state and the basic parameters of 
rightful state action” (Reus-Smit 1999, 26).  Sovereignty is not self-referential and alone it can 
never provide a sufficient account of international politics.  Instead, Reus-Smit argues we must 
situate the sovereign state system as a dependent variable within constitutional structures 
indicative of larger social metavalues.  Since sovereignty can provide neither a functional nor a 
justificatory account of state action, arguments for specific courses of action require recourse to a 
set of shared inter-subjective values.  In addition to this “moral purpose of the state” and 
Ruggie’s principle of actor differentiation, Reus-Smit identifies norms of “pure procedural 
justice” as a third normative element sustaining international constitutional structures (Reus-Smit 
1999, 31-32).  This concept of justice doesn’t dictate any determinate course of action, instead 
prescribing an ideal procedure for collective action and the resolution of conflict. 
 Reus-Smit’s focus on constitutional structures strongly suggests an alternative theory for 
fundamental political transformation.  If constitutional structures and the moral fabric of state 
subjectivity have a direct and causal role in selecting the predominant unit within international 
order, the primary source of systems change must be understood in terms of these structural 
metavalues.  This theoretical move adds a layer of complexity that even Deudney’s nuanced 
vision cannot account for—beyond anarchy and hierarchy, constitutional theory allows us to see 
the historical and normative narratives that underpin a given system of order.  Reus-Smit argues 
that changes to constitutional structures manifest themselves as either ‘purposive change’, a shift 
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in the moral purpose of the state, or ‘configurative change’, which includes not only a shift in 
moral purpose but also fundamental transformation in the organizational and differentiating 
properties of the system itself (Reus-Smit 1999, 164).  It’s not enough to ask whether anarchy or 
sovereignty is waning or waxing without an examination of the constitutional structures that 
provide the content to fill out the historically specific form of political organization. 
 While Reus-Smit’s view claims to provide a framework capable of organizing the social 
panoply described by Ruggie, his argument falls prey to many of the same indicts as the social 
epistemic approach.  Specifically, while Reus-Smit’s argument claims to have a causal element, 
he can never identify the fundamental sources of antagonism that drive political transformation.  
This becomes especially evident when we attempt to account for war within Reus-Smit’s model.  
Because of its emphasis on cooperative social institutions, Reus-Smit’s theory glosses over 
actual periods of war to primarily address subsequent periods of treaty writing, leading Jennifer 
Sterling-Folker to wonder: “If the state’s internal meta-moral purposes produce cooperative 
institutions at the interstate level, then why does interstate war even occur?” (Sterling-Folker 
1999, 265).  Just as cooperative practices emerge as the consequence of a given social context, 
war must also be understood as the product of intensive social conditioning.  Different states 
embedded in different social and historical modes conduct war very differently.  The lack of any 
substantive social theory of war makes Reus-Smit’s theory seem incoherent, or at the very least 
incomplete.   
Moving from considerations of methodology to ontology, Reus-Smit overdetermines the 
transition between historical modes of political order along rigid “before and after” lines.  This is 
especially evident in his attempt to differentiate purposive from configurative change.  Reus-
Smit’s argument (change between feudal and absolutist forms of political organization 
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represented a fundamental shift in international unit-type differentiation while transformation 
between absolutist and modern forms maintained static unit-type differences) lacks any 
substantive warrant beyond recitation of artificially rigid temporal boundaries.  Even if we can 
ascertain a strict demarcation between moral purposes in these epochs, attempts to synthesize 
change at the ideational and constitutional level fail to address a historical record full of 
competing organizational models.12  While Reus-Smit’s text seems to provide a compelling new 
account of socially-driven systems change, its methodological failure to understand war socially 
and its ahistorical ontological division between constitutional epochs demonstrate the need for a 
more consistent model. 
A final theory of change in political organization rooted in a social constructivist vision 
of the world can be found in Rodney Bruce Hall’s National Collective Identity.  Where Ruggie 
and Reus-Smit’s insight for the most part comes at the expense of causal examination, Hall 
attempts to synthesize social practice into a causal framework.   Hall’s vision of the relationship 
between changes in collective identity and changes in the international system can be 
synthesized into the following series: 
∆ (co-constituted individual / collective identity) → ∆ legitimating principles → ∆ 
institutions → ∆ domestic & international norms/rules/principles→ ∆ system (Hall 2007, 
21). 
Hall argues that the prime mover behind change in political organization is change in the 
constitutive relationship between individual and collective identity.  Each historically-constituted 
identity form privileges certain institutional norms and practices.  When changes to the 
fundamental identity of actors within a given international order occur, the very constitution of a 
legitimate relationship between structure and agency is similarly challenged.  Consequently, the 
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 The examples given by Teschke (2003) on page 15 are only a few of the historically competitive forms of political 
organization.  For more, see Spruyt (1994) and Van Creveld (1999). 
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institutional form through which identity is expressed to other societal groups must also evolve 
to meet these new criteria of legitimacy.  “That which constitutes an appropriate institutional 
vehicle through which society may take social action is strongly conditioned by which form of 
polity the society considers itself to be” (Hall 1999, 30, emphasis in original).  It is here that we 
see fundamental changes in political organization, with Hall arguing for the transition between 
dynastic-sovereign, territorial-sovereign, and national-sovereign forms of institutional political 
order.  New norms, rules and organizing principles concerning socio-political, socio-economic, 
inter-societal, and security variables spill out of these new institutions, finally manifesting in a 
holistic systems change (Hall 1999, 29-30).  By fusing a constitutive approach to individual and 
collective identity with a causal understanding of institutional transformation, Hall appears to 
neatly sidestep the criticisms levied against Ruggie and Reus-Smit. 
  Hall’s very ability to sidestep and dismiss virtually all the criticisms leveled against the 
social epistemic and constitutional structural theories of political transformation, however, 
should give us pause.  A large portion of Hall’s wriggle room is undoubtedly due to his nebulous 
concept of societal collective identity.  At no point in the text does Hall hammer out the precise 
contours of what characteristics define collective identity.  Furthermore, there is no substantive 
theoretical basis on which to understand the fundamental transformation of individual and 
collective identity.  As Mlada Bukanovsky convincingly argues, the definitional looseness of 
these concepts “gives him the freedom to tell a rich story about nationalism, but there is some 
sacrifice of conceptual rigor insofar as the forces that crystallized nationalism are ‘complex and 
historically contingent’” (Bukanovsky 2000, 240).  A second concern lies with Hall’s inability to 
explain how the transformation in social identity operates.  Specifically, why do certain visions 
of individual and collective identity win out?  Why do certain legitimating and organizing 
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principles become dominant?  Hall concedes that collective identity formation is an inherently 
contested process, which means any theorization under his rubric is inevitably bound up with 
whatever social identity the theorist chooses as a starting point.  Absent some principle of 
evaluation, Hall’s argument is less theoretical and more descriptive.  Finally, and in the same 
way that Reus-Smit’s constitutional theory struggles with the reality of conflict, Hall’s theory has 
some difficulty dealing with the relationship between social identity and war.  While the causal 
theory Hall describes has the potential to account for changes in the macro-historical conduct of 
war (those fundamental and constitutive antagonisms motivating conflict), it struggles to account 
for the role of war as a co-constitutive social phenomenon.13  Changes in the technology or social 
organization of war neither stem from transformation in social identity nor necessitate any 
change in actor identity.   In not treating war as a social type except at the broadest historical 
level, Hall’s theory excludes any consideration of warfighting practices or societal modes of war 
in a political theory of transformation.  Hall’s restoration of the causal dimension to systems 
change theory is a necessary corrective to Ruggie and Reus-Smit’s analysis, but the conceptual 
fuzziness of societal collective identity and its subsequent inability to account for war’s social 
function outside of broad historical structures demonstrate the need to focus on a different 
constitutive variable. 
  
NEO-MARXISM 
Instead of focusing on anarchy or social identity as the predominant constitutive variable behind 
transformation in political order, the Neo-Marxist school attempts to historicize the central role 
of production in the creation and recreation of distinct polities.  Justin Rosenberg’s ground-
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 In the language of Chapter 2, Hall’s theory can account for changes in the historical structure of war, but cannot 
account for changes in either the warfighting paradigm or the social mode of warfare. 
29 
breaking text Empire of Civil Society represents the first real attempt to synthesize this move into 
a coherent theory.  Rosenberg begins with a proposition familiar to Marxist analyses of 
international relations, namely that political organization is a subsidiary effect of market 
dynamics.  Consequently, change in political organization, including attendant patterns of 
competition and coercion, is a consequence of change in the social division of labor (Rosenberg 
1994, 6).  This mimetic relationship is established through analysis of the Greek polis, the Italian 
city-state, the early modern empire, and the modern sovereign state.  Each form of political 
organization is argued to be bound up with and necessarily follow from a historically-specific, 
structural mode of production.  Where Rosenberg breaks with the orthodox Marxist tradition and 
provides a radical new way to analyze this developmental relationship, however, is in his 
treatment of the connection between the development of capitalism and the logic of sovereignty.  
With capitalism’s explicit devolution of economic rationality to an ‘invisible hand’ outside of the 
realm of government, politics is for the first time able to emerge as more than mere market 
maintenance.  The balance of power within anarchy, which realists have taken as a transhistorical 
condition affecting all forms of political organization, only emerges in Rosenberg’s account 
when economic and political rationality are externalized from direct political administration to a 
broadly-understood anarchical system.  In this fashion, “the balance of power is not just like the 
invisible hand.  It is its other half, the equivalent in the public political realm of the alienated 
social form of the invisible hand in the private political realm of ‘the economy’” (Rosenberg 
1994, 139, emphasis in original).  Capitalism, the sovereign territorial state, and the modern state 
system all operated together as autonomous realms birthed in large part as a consequence of 
capitalism’s division of societal practices into public and private spheres. 
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 Rosenberg’s argument, while revolutionary, has a few theoretical difficulties as a 
consequence of its structural Marxist roots.  While Rosenberg’s theory tends to treat the 
transition between different modes of production and political systems as direct and linear, he 
also acknowledges that political transition was an uneven, long-term process.  Consequently, 
Rosenberg’s theory has difficulty with the macro-historical questions of transition.  Where, when 
and how does capitalism and the modern-state system emerge?  How can we reconcile such an 
account with the long-term transition between political forms?  In an attempt to smooth out these 
discontinuities and provide a consistent theoretical account, Benno Teschke’s The Myth of 1648 
endeavors to reconcile a non-deterministic account of political development with a social theory 
based in production.  The critical step taken by Teschke is to recognize that any transition in 
holistic geopolitical order depends on a logically prior transformation in the constituent elements 
of such an order.  For Teschke, the fundamental connection between political agents is found in 
social property relations, which mediate differences between classes in a given historical order 
(Teschke 2003, 7).  Political institutions are created and maintained in an attempt to fix social 
property relations with enforceable rules and norms for legitimate conduct.  These strategies of 
reproduction, because of their consistency, form the basis for domestic and international political 
order.  As fundamental challenges to a given mode of social property relations emerge, political 
order is reconstituted around newly formed property regimes.  To demonstrate the historical 
basis of his thesis, Teschke traces the transition in social property relations and the attendant shift 
in political organization from feudal lordship, to absolutism and fragmented sovereignty, and 
finally to the set of social relations in England that allowed for the emergence of the modern 
state.  The consequence of Teschke’s shift is precisely that no transition in economic or political 
order is taken for granted.  The development of capitalism, unlike in Rosenberg’s account, is not 
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read as a fundamental break with all prior forms of political organization.  Instead, Teschke 
holds it should be viewed as just another element within the historical continuum, albeit one that 
gave rise to the modern, territorial-sovereign state. 
 While the neo-Marxist account provides a powerful and sweeping critique of 
international relations scholarship on the state, it quickly becomes mired in some of the problems 
it claims to resolve.   Richard Mansbach argues that while Teschke’s (and to a lesser extent 
Rosenberg’s) account provides a trenchant argument in favor of abandoning deterministic 
periodization; it ends up recreating the very same determinism around social property relations 
(Mansbach 2003, 2).  Factors like nationalism, democracy, and religion are left completely out of 
the account.  Also absent from this neo-Marxist theory is any systematic account of the 
constitutive role of war in the transition from one political order to another.  Rosenberg doesn’t 
address this concern whatsoever, instead focusing on underlying economic causes and treating 
war as a symptom.  Such an analysis, however, ignores the role militaries played in determining 
the success or failure of a given polity.  It has never been enough to provide a good economic 
model—absent a capable military, social groups and their governments have been eliminated 
throughout history.  Teschke provides a much more nuanced account of the constitutive 
phenomenon of war.  Arguing that war-making was the dominant form of rationality for the 
feudalist lordship, consequent “military innovations based upon systematic investment in the 
means of violence were spectacular throughout the Middle Ages and beyond” (Teschke 2003, 
61).  This argument, however, seems to undermine Teschke’s belief that the fundamental basis of 
political order is social property relations and not warfare.  In many ways, Teschke’s argument 
here belies Frank Parkin’s assertion that “inside every neo-Marxist there seems to be a Weberian 
struggling to get out” (Parkin 1979, 25).  While this account of warfare better addresses its 
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function in political transformation than does Rosenberg’s, it still treats war as a contingent, 
unnecessary variable in social organization.  The existence of war throughout history, however, 
seems to militate against such an assertion.   Additionally, despite Teschke’s argument that the 
problem with neo-Weberian analysis is that it lacks a social theory of war, his conceptual linkage 
between feudal rationality and warfare only operates at the level of technological and tactical 
innovation.  It does not and cannot address the role of war as a structuring element behind social 
or historical processes, opting instead for a more general theory of social property relations.  As 
advocates of the geopolitical competition model will argue, while it’s possible to derive social 
property relations from an account of war, it is theoretically untenable to reverse that causal 
chain.  While the neo-Marxist vision of change in political organization does a fantastic job 
critiquing the assumptions of the different accounts put forth by scholars of international 
relations, it struggles to account for non-economic variables in the transition from one state to 
another, especially the constitutive role of war. 
 
COMMERCIALIZATION MODEL 
Moving out of the field of political science and into the historical sociological school of inquiry, 
we find a broad literature with just as much to say concerning the origin and future direction of 
the state as does the international relations corpus.  One particular field of historical sociology, 
commonly grouped together as the ‘commercialization model’, emphasizes the role of commerce 
and trade in political transformation.  A foundational text in this light is Fernand Braudel’s On 
History, which in turn provides the insight underpinning Immanuel Wallerstein’s World-Systems 
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Analysis.14  Braudel argues that history should be understood through three temporal analytic 
modes (Braudel 1982, 28-9).15  The first, which he calls l’histoire événmentielle or the 
continuously changing context of individual and micro-level undertakings, is concerned with the 
actions and interactions of individuals.  Changes on this scale happen often and quite rapidly—
this is journalistic time.  The second, which Braudel calls conjoncture, represents structural 
history including economic and political shifts.  In this context, history is viewed episodically 
and is measured in decades, with “Romanticism, the French Revolution, the Industrial 
Revolution, [and] World War II” as typical examples (Braudel 1993, 34).  The final pace of 
history presented by Braudel is the longue durée, or the deeply embedded, long-term historical 
factors that seem to embedded individuals as eternal and unchanging elements within the world.  
It is in the longue durée that we see the potential for systems level change, in that this type of 
history relies on a consistent unit type to form the underlying structure of political order. 
 Analyzing history through different temporal patterns of transition, however, does not 
preclude Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory from identifying a singular structural base upon which 
all other historical considerations are dependent.  This prime mover is termed by Braudel the 
‘Weltwirtschaft’ (‘world-economy’), the “economically autonomous section of the planet able to 
provide for most of its own needs, a section to which its internal links and exchanges give a 
certain organic unity” (Braudel 1992, 22).  The world-economy represents the totality of 
structured interactions in both trade and geopolitics that exist between polities in a given 
historical order.  Each manifestation of the world-economy (which Wallerstein alternatively 
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 Chase-Dunn and Podobnik (1995) provide an interesting corollary.  They conclude, based on a world-systems 
analysis, that political transition is a function of necessary struggle and predict the next transition, possibly to a 
global state, around 2020.   
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 Although the argument is first presented in Braudel (1972) and is further clarified in Braudel (1993), On History 
gives us the conceptual language that constitutes the basis for both the broader, more metaphorical argument found 
in the earlier text and the more narrowly conceived research agenda found in Braudel’s later work. 
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describes as the world-system) presents a tripartite order with a dominant and prosperous core, a 
largely acquiescent semi-periphery, and an impoverished and highly dependent periphery.  These 
distinctions are maintained in hierarchical fashion by the asymmetries found between polities in 
both their ability to materially produce goods and services and their ability to shape the 
ideational context in which distributional inequities are legitimized.  State formation, 
consolidation, and transformation emerge out of this hierarchical divide—the form of political 
organization adopted by polities was a direct effect of their position within the world-system 
(Wallerstein 2004, 16).  The Braudel-Wallerstein model of political organization argues that the 
state (or really any form of political organization) cannot be viewed in any context other than its 
relation to trade.  Both the strength and form of a state are determined entirely by its position in 
the world-economy: 
At the center of the world-economy, one always finds an exceptional state, strong, 
aggressive and privileged, dynamic, simultaneously feared and admired.  […] How could 
these central governments fail to be strong? […] [Arguments to the contrary] overlook 
the inevitable:  as if the central position itself could fail to create and demand effective 
government, as if government and society could fail to form an indivisible whole, and as 
if money could fail to create both social discipline and an extraordinary capacity for 
action (Braudel 1992, 51). 
To understand the consequences of political organization, then, we must examine the interactions 
between the core and the periphery in a given world-economy.  Braudel and Wallerstein cite the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism as one transition in the longue durée of the world-
economy.  What remains static in this theorization, however, is precisely the inevitably 
constituted nature of economic inequality.  “Slavery, serfdom, and wage-labour are historically 
and socially different solutions to a universal problem, which remains fundamentally the same” 
(Braudel 1992, 63). 
 Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory of the state and political organization appears in many 
ways to be a transverse mirror of the neorealist argument.  Where Braudel’s historical framework 
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tells us we must understand history through a number of different temporal forms of 
transformation, the argument for a universal world-economy contends that international markets 
constitute a static dimension for polities and their politics.  “In other words, capitalism is not 
regarded as a qualitative, potentially reversible transformation of social relations, but simply a 
gradual quantitative expansion of the market since time immemorial (Teschke 2003, 137).  Any 
and all critiques of the neorealist argument that anarchy is a necessary and timeless structuring 
element in global politics can be levied against this similar assertion of the universality of market 
dynamics.  Braudel and Wallerstein might respond that unlike neorealism, which is impoverished 
precisely because of its lack of a historical dimension, a world-systems analysis is explicitly 
grounded in history and thus doesn’t fall into any of these critiques.  Historical inquiry into the 
formation of the state, however, would seem to disprove this argument.  The Braudel-Wallerstein 
model, in arguing for the transhistorical constancy of core-periphery relations, accounts for the 
rise of the modern state as part of an inevitable march of the market.  As Hendrik Spruyt argues, 
however, there was “nothing inevitable about the emergence of the sovereign, territorial state” 
(Spruyt 1994, 18).  Braudel and Wallerstein have no way to account for the wide variety of 
political formations in early modern Europe, or why certain social and political variables led to 
the creation of very different polities.  In positing a wholly determinate system, the theory 
advanced by Braudel and Wallerstein is unable to explain why changes in political organization 
emerge or why some unit types flourish while others fail. 
Arguing that Braudel and Wallerstein’s theory lacks the necessary theoretical nuance to 
account for transformation in political organization, Spruyt advances a much more complex and 
contingent version of the commercialization model.  While historians of the state like Braudel 
are happy to ascribe the evolution of centralized, territorial authority in terms of a logical 
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progression from feudalism to the state system, such an account ignores the multiplicity of 
political forms that arose after the collapse of feudal authority.  Instead, the historian “must […] 
first […] explain not merely why states superseded feudal organization but why a variety of 
alternatives emerged following feudalism.  We need, secondly, to account for the superiority of 
the state vis-à-vis these alternatives” (Spruyt 1994, 18).  Spruyt argues that instead of a logical, 
unilinear theory of political evolution, we should embrace a theory of rapid and massive change, 
or “…a dramatic shift along several dimensions simultaneously in response to a powerful 
environmental change” (Spruyt 1994, 7).  Spruyt attempts to do this by setting the Braudelian 
model of multiple temporal perspectives against Gilpin’s model of change in international 
organization.  This insight allows us to see the similarities between Gilpin’s three modes of 
change and Braudel’s temporal map, with the l’histoire evenementielle manifesting itself as 
Gilpin’s rapid interaction changes, conjunctures reflecting the speed of systemic change, and the 
longue durée indicating the scale upon which systems change operates.   
As useful as placing Gilpin’s types of change against Braudel’s temporal layers is, Spruyt 
argues that theory still struggles to account for the rapidity and infrequency of system-level 
change.  Consequently, Spruyt brings in another outside theory—Stephen Jay Gould’s theory of 
punctuated equilibrium.  Instead of viewing evolution as a process that either moved in a 
unilinear fashion replacing one species with another or a continual process adding more and 
more species, Gould argues that evolution “…is adaptation to changing environments, not 
progress” (Spruyt 1994, 24).   Faced with a massive environmental change, species are forced to 
make rapid progress toward a new evolutionary stage, which in turn creates a new stage of 
natural selection.  Such an understanding of evolution fixes the flaws of prior unilinear versions 
of the theory in that it does not put any stock into necessity or predictability, but instead theorizes 
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evolution as a purely responsive mechanism.  Such a theory provides an excellent metaphor for 
understanding system-level transformation in political organization.  When we analyze a period 
of massive systemic changes, whether it be in the feudal to state transition or the period of global 
uncertainty of today, looking at the emergent competing political forms and tracing them back to 
the environmental change that caused them allows us to tell a story of how change is happening 
and what we can expect going forward. 
 In a similar, more context-driven light than Braudel and Wallerstein, Spruyt sees the 
environmental change driving transformation in political organization as a consequence of “the 
expansion of trade […] during the High Middle Ages” (Spruyt 1994, 25).  This expansion of 
markets, however, cannot be seen as a pan-European phenomenon, but instead must be 
understood as situated in regional networks.  Where the strength of the French monarchy vis-à-
vis the peasantry allowed for the institution of central taxation and rationalized commerce in an 
absolutist, sovereign polity that would lead to the modern state, the German and Italian models 
emerged from entirely different economic and social realities.  The German model of political 
organization, owing to a general rapprochement between the nobility and the monarchy, was 
explicitly extraterritorial and coalesced around a city-league model exemplified by the Hansa.  
The Italian model, as a consequence of systemic failure to assert central territorial control and the 
effect of German imperial policy, organized locally around strong urban leaders into city-states.  
The rapid and contemporaneous emergence of these three models established a pattern of 
institutional competition that continued for centuries and ultimately culminated with the success 
of the sovereign state. 
 While Spruyt’s synthesis of much of the most valuable insight from previous scholars 
into a meta-theoretical argument for change is at once persuasive and extremely useful, his 
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commercialization argument does not provide a sufficient cause to account for political 
transformation.  In a similar matter to Wallerstein and Braudel’s formulation of the commercial 
transition, Spruyt assumes that the expansion of trade constituted a shock to feudal political 
organization.  Teschke, however, contends that town commerce was “indeed economically 
internal to feudalism” (Teschke 2003, 35).  This embeddedness of economic gains to the feudal 
economy calls into question Spruyt’s argument that the massive expansion of the market 
provides the environmental change necessary for the development of new political models.  In 
addition, Spruyt’s set of three institutional models (sovereign territorial state, city-states, and 
city-leagues) massively understates the amount of polities that not only existed at the time of the 
shock, but in many ways continued their rule uninterrupted for centuries.  The Holy Roman 
Empire, for instance, “combined decentralized semi-autonomous actors under an imperial 
umbrella and survived until 1806” (Teschke 2003, 37).  The continued existence of these 
alternative forms of political organization tends to suggest that the institutional competition 
Spruyt suggests should not be understood as a function of market rationality and competition.  
Finally, and most crucially, Spruyt’s model has major difficulties with the violence-driven nature 
of medieval geopolitics.  Interactions among polities were mostly structured around the 
institution of war—both the signing of treaties and consummation of alliances are a consequence 
of a military-centric mode of thought.  Spruyt would likely to respond to this criticism by 
restating the argument he makes against Charles Tilly.  While he views war as an important 
dimension to be considered in any history of political organization, Spruyt argues that war is not 
adequate to account for differences in institutional forms and the continued existence of non-
military powers.  This argument, however, completely misses the point.  While the effectiveness 
of a country in war may not be an adequate basis around which to understand political 
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organization, understanding changes in social organization as structured around the fundamental 
institution of warfare can explain institutional differentiation while accounting for violence-
interdependence in the international context. The complete inability of Spruyt’s theory to provide 
any account for the socially-constitutive dimension of war is a major shortcoming.  
 
GEOPOLITICAL COMPETITION MODEL 
Against the commercialization model, a strongly contrasting historical sociological theory of 
state formation is presented by advocates of the geopolitical competition model.  Exemplifying 
this school of thought is Charles Tilly’s Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992.16  
Instead of evaluating new rationalities in markets and trading regimes as the prime mover of 
change in political organization, Tilly argues that “[w]ithin limits set by the demands and 
rewards of other states, extraction and struggle over the means of war created the central 
organizational structure of states” (Tilly 1992, 15).  Tilly’s argument stems from two 
fundamental dilemmas.  The first is that success in war requires positive administration over 
more territories and peoples.  Subsequently, larger polities and their administrative duties divert 
the focus away from war towards governance.  The second dilemma is that maintaining the 
ability to conduct war requires ever increasing extraction of resources, which in turn requires the 
creation of political infrastructure.  This newly created infrastructure, however, quickly moves 
beyond military interests and actually alters the character and checks the intensity of war.  State 
formation specifically, and political organization in general, should be understood as an attempt 
to maximize this nexus between the means of coercion and the extraction of resources required 
to maintain those very means.  Tilly succinctly establishes the relationship between these modes 
of administration, state and city growth, and state form in the following chart (Tilly 1992, 27): 
                                                 
16
 For similar arguments to this thesis, see Porter (1994), Ertman (1997), and Bobbitt (2002). 
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Figure 1.1.  The Nexus of Capital and Coercion in State Formation 
 
 
This model provides a means to analyze both the transition from feudalism to the 
sovereign system as well as the modern calcification of borders and proliferation of civil conflict.  
Tilly begins with the feudal transition, arguing that the central unifying character behind 
European political transformation was a direct effect of polities attempting to maximize coercion 
and extraction within their authority: 
Europeans followed a standard war-provoking logic: everyone who controlled substantial 
coercive means tried to maintain a secure area within which he could enjoy the returns 
from coercion, plus a fortified buffer zone, possibly run at a loss, to protect the secure 
area. […] When that operation succeeded for a while, the buffer zone turned into a secure 
area, which encouraged the wielder of coercion to acquire a new buffer zone surrounding 
the old.  So long as adjacent powers were pursuing the same logic, war resulted (Tilly 
1992, 70-1). 
While this logic could operate in the diffuse fashion of feudalism before the gunpowder 
revolution, Tilly argues that the vast expense required to maintain a trained and equipped 
military armed with cannons and firearms far outstripped the limited financial means of feudal 
lords and their narrow principalities.  Consequently, political organization began to move 
towards large, sovereign, and reified forms of political organization best able to maximize 
coercion and extraction within their borders.  As we’ve moved into the post-World War II 
environment, where the European state system has become the de facto global system and 
borders have largely become static worldwide, Tilly argues that the role of militaries within 
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states has become even more pervasive.  More powerful, specialized states are likely to reach 
beneficial economic and security relationships with smaller states instead of militarily 
incorporating their territory.  When combined with the increasingly destructive power of nuclear 
arms and other advanced weapons systems, the very nature of war has shifted.  Wars remain 
incredibly brutal, but have largely stopped being fought over borders and have instead taken on 
the form of lethal civil conflicts, often involving mass slaughter and genocide.  “Armies […] 
concentrate increasingly on repression of civilian populations, combat of insurgents, and seizures 
of power.  As a consequence, governments become more unstable as their borders become more 
secure” (Tilly 1992, 203).17  Tilly argues that the states that have emerged in the Third World 
since World War II have tended to follow coercion-intensive paths relying heavily on the 
repressive military forces left behind after European colonialism.  These militaries have become 
resistant to civilian power, and as of Tilly’s writing rule approximately 40 percent of the world’s 
states were living under direct military rule.  Consequently, Tilly worries of “…the risk that a 
war in the Third World will involve nuclear arms or lead to a great power confrontation” (Tilly 
1992, 217). 
 As a corollary to Tilly’s work, and one that in some ways surpasses it, Michael Mann’s 
version of the geopolitical competition model in The Sources of Social Power gives an account 
of European political ascendancy that attempts to reconcile the developmental relationship 
between capitalism, the modern state, and the international state system.  Mann identifies three 
distinct phases of political development that eventually coalesced into the modern state and the 
modern state-system.  The first is a general cultural and economic unification that occurred in 
Europe throughout the late feudal period, in which the expansions of trade and Christendom 
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 Atzili (2007) similarly argues that the largely fixed territorial status in the modern geopolitical order makes weak 
states weaker and more prone to violence by eliminating the external threat that would otherwise provide the main 
impetus for state building. 
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provided a fertile ground for mutually interacting power networks aimed at the creation of 
wealth.  The fact that all of these variables coalesced at once is seen by Mann as a giant 
coincidence, but the single unifying developmental relation that he argues is unique to European 
development was the broad cultural influence and subjective appeal of Christianity.  “Although 
the power structures of Rome are an essential background for understanding, say, the origins of 
the manor, and those of Germany for understanding vassalage, Christianity’s origins were 
somewhat interstitial to both” (Mann 1986, 505).  The second phase of development relies on 
another set of coincidences, this time environmental.  The combination of propitious growing 
conditions and trade routes increased agricultural and commercial development, while the rise of 
Islam to the east blocked outward expansion.  The combination of these economic and 
geographical pressures with the Military Revolution led to the emergence of a new political 
spectrum—from diffuse feudalism emerged a “simpler, modern form: a multistate capitalist 
civilization” (Mann 1986, 510).  Echoing Tilly’s argument, the final stage is the development of 
conflictual relations as military relations required ever more resource extraction and competition 
over a relatively limited resource base.  Where Tilly’s account is non-deterministic, emphasizing 
the variety of political forms that emerged around balancing extraction and coercion, Mann’s 
account argues that each of these emerging polities responded to the same political realities in 
functionally the exact same way.  Mann’s greatest theoretical insight, however, is found in his 
remapping of the relationship between capitalism and warfare.  While the standard account of 
this link views warfare as a subsidiary effect of capitalist and statist relations, Mann reverses this 
chain of causality, arguing that the necessities of military organization made extraction-intensive 
methods necessary and drove the historical development of both territoriality and capitalism 
itself (Mann 1986, 454).18 
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 For a more detailed treatment of this causal reversal, see Mann (1988a, 1988b).  For critiques of this 
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 While the geopolitical competition model advanced by Tilly and Mann provides a 
powerful account for evolution in political organization as a consequence of war, there are a few 
conceptual problems with its theoretical corpus.  First, Mann’s model is too deterministic, and 
cannot account for differentiation in polities or their politics, opting instead for a sweeping 
account of pan-European social conditions.  Attempting to lump together all of the various post-
feudal polities under a single structuring vision risks recreating all of the problems of the 
commercialization model isolated in the previous section.  Tilly’s account, however, takes the 
necessary step out of this determinism to suggest a wide variety of political options that 
competed for ideological preeminence on the post-feudal stage.  Two main critiques of this 
approach emerge from the literature.  The first critique, advanced by Spruyt, is that actors 
possessing greater military capability were often outperformed by actors with less of a material 
base.  The example Spruyt gives to substantiate this argument is the political success of the 
materially-lacking French Capetian kings and the failure of the militarily powerful duke of 
Normandy (Spruyt 1994, 31).  A second critique, advanced by Teschke, is that the geopolitical 
competition model lacks a causal element.  Specifically, “the geopolitical competition literature 
does not explain why the mere fact of territorial contiguity necessarily entails competition” 
(Teschke 2003, 123).  Both of these problems can be summed up in Teschke’s argument that the 
geopolitical competition model lacks any social theory of war.  Both Tilly and Mann treat war as 
a contingent effect of technology and tactics, never considering the effect war has on domestic 
policies and audiences, not to mention the historical aspect of warfare.  Without a substantial 
theorization of the predominant social mode of warfare, we are left with “an anthropologically 
questionable idea of man as a natural power-maximizer or a psychologizing rational-choice 
model” (Teschke 2003, 123).  Neither of these options is sufficiently explanatory, which is why 
                                                                                                                                                             
reformulation, see Teschke (2003) and Bonney (1995) 
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any account of political organization through warfare must account for more than the what and 
how of war, and bring in the question of why. 
 
GLOBALITY 
Martin Shaw’s Theory of the Global State attempts to synthesize the most valuable elements 
contained in the models of systems change elucidated above into a comprehensive account of the 
underlying forces behind global revolution.  Shaw brackets out three visions of transformation in 
contemporary social and international relations theory; specifically, the conditions variously 
described as postmodernity, globalization, or the post-Cold War world (Shaw 2000a, 2-4).  
These narratives of transformation, however, are fundamentally incomplete insofar as they 
isolate a predominant cause of change and ignore the integration of political, military, social and 
economic relations into an emergent global consciousness.  Shaw argues that the problem with 
contemporary formulations of emergent global behavior is that they presume both too much and 
too little.  On the one hand, accounts of global transformation that are unintentional and 
mechanistic necessarily overdetermine change by denying human agency.  “Globality is not the 
result of a global teleology or a global spirit. It is, however, the outcome of the conscious and 
intentional actions of many individual and collective human actors” (Shaw 2000a, 17).   In a 
world of emergent global institutions, we can no longer view the economic, political, or social as 
autonomous spheres in a direct cause and effect relationship with one another.  Instead, Shaw 
argues we must recognize their increasingly overlapping and interconnected character.  If the 
predominant structural relationship is too stratified and determinate, the basis on which 
contemporary scholars understand the global is grossly underdeveloped.  Debates about global 
trade and transnational institutions are impoverished precisely because they lack any historical 
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character or context.  Put more plainly, contemporary scholars of globalization, postmodernism 
or the post-Cold War world cannot adequately distinguish a system of integrating nation-states 
from previous arrangements organized around sovereign, imperial, and national societal borders.   
Shaw’s thesis is an attempt to fill this conceptual lacuna by adequately theorizing and 
historicizing the contemporary transformation of political organization around three central 
concepts.  Because the three major accounts for contemporary political transformation are all 
trapped in the methodologies, epistemologies, and ontologies of their respective fields, Shaw 
calls for a new, broad-based theory to account for the transformation to global consciousness.  
He terms this emergent phenomenon the ‘global revolution’, which he distinguishes from 
traditional visions of social revolutions in a number of ways.  While it is not bound up with 
territoriality or nationality, it similarly doesn’t begin from any universal political demand.  
Instead, while the “global revolution involves a transformation of social relations in general, […] 
at its heart are key upheavals in relations between political and military power.  […] [I]t is the 
connection between wider social and more narrowly political processes that give the changes of 
our times their distinctively revolutionary character” (Shaw 2000a, 8).  If the global revolution is 
the mode by which we’re moving into a global era, Shaw terms the new ideological rationality 
driving it as ‘globality’. Put simply, globality is the social condition in which things are seen as 
global, and it represents a fundamental break with the social forms of modernity.  The global in 
this context is more than just a way to understand time and space.  Shaw sees in the transition to 
globality the very real possibility of a common, all-inclusive consciousness of human society—
an actualization of the global village.   
The realization of globality in political form is found in what Shaw terms the ‘global 
state’.  The dominance of the Western state model has led to increasing global institutional and 
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ideational integration into what Shaw terms variously as ‘the Western bloc-state”, the 
“internationalized Western conglomerate”, and “Western-global state structures” (Shaw 2000a, 
252, 265; 269).  Shaw argues that the likely conclusion to the current global revolution is a series 
of violent conflicts eventually culminating in the realization of worldwide global institutionalism 
and the development of a truly global consciousness.  This vision of the global state is distinct 
from Wendt’s theory, however, because Shaw is careful to argue that there is nothing certain in 
this transition.  Just as easily as the project toward integration at the global layer could buckle 
under the weight of culture, religion and nationality, Shaw concludes that the Western state itself 
could potentially fracture and cease to be the predominant unit type in political order (Shaw 
2000a, 255-6; 269).  Ultimately, however, Shaw concludes that although process is likely to be 
slow and uneven, the spread of institutions globally and subsequent realization of a global-
democratic ideal is virtually a foregone conclusion.19  
Although Shaw’s argument makes a valiant effort to synthesize the various methods and 
approaches to change in political organization, in many ways it unconsciously repeats the errors 
it identifies in the extant literature.  First of all, after offering a trenchant critique of the focus on 
nationality and internationality in a world where global forces are changing the very nature of 
political, economic, social and ideological interaction, his conclusion draws on the very statist 
method that he critiques.  Shaw even goes so far as to claim at the end of his chapter on history 
and agency that the “tendency of revolutions to encourage the growth of the state may be a 
general law” (Shaw 2000a, 170).  Through these arguments, Shaw comes closer to Waltz or 
Wendt’s structural determinism than real historical inquiry.  Instead of identifying the territorial 
                                                 
19
 Shaw argues that the consequences of inaction will only become more and more dire, on the one hand preventing 
responses to poverty and human rights violations (Shaw 2000b, 19-20) and on the other hand potentially leading to 
genocidal or even nuclear conflicts (Shaw 2001, 647). While it requires repeated crisis to move towards global 
institutionalism, Shaw’s vision of the future strongly suggests the world will get much worse before it gets better. 
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state as a relatively recent product of history in the context of human social organization, Shaw 
ontologizes it as a general structuring principle within international relations.  Similarly, 
although early on in the text Shaw argues that the military-political transformation played a 
profound and constitutive role in activating the global revolution, war as the prime mover falls 
by the wayside in favor of an analysis of the motivating value of the global democratic project.  
Instead of focusing on the role of conflict in political transformation, which has the potential to 
methodologically account for different historical periods, Shaw decides to argue for the global 
revolution as historically discontinuous and ‘unique’.  Unlike warfare, however, democracy is a 
historically-localized, non-natural part of a wide variety of political forms.  Shaw’s conclusion 
sounds positively Fukuyaman at the end when he concludes that after many struggles, we will 
see the emergence of a global democratic state representing “some kind of interim conclusion” to 
transformation in political organization (Shaw 2000a, 269).  This “normative and ideological” 
position ignores the periphery, scapegoats and maligns communism, and ignores the constitutive 
role of Western colonialism and imperialism (Robinson 2000, 1046).  Shaw’s synthesis of the 
current literature in the context of the changing politics of globalization and argument for its 
methodological inadequacy can be at times profound, but the conclusions he draws from this 
unique starting point largely fly in the face of the methodological consistency he establishes at 
the outset. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the literature concerning transformation in political organization is both deep and 
broad, there appear to be three primary sources of conceptual tension that remain unresolved.  
First, to the extent that theories provide a universal basis for political transformation, they tend to 
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emphasize the effect of a single variable or theoretical perspective in a highly determinate 
fashion.  Examples abound, from the dogged adherence by traditional and critical realist scholars 
to the structuring principle of anarchy, to the belief in the unchanging nature of market relations 
and the world-economy in Braudel and Wallerstein’s commercialization model, and even to the 
end of history democratic discourse implicit in Shaw’s theory of globality.  Each of these 
theoretical models is problematic insofar as they fix the role of change to variables that can be 
demonstrated not to apply to certain historical polities and transformations.  What almost all of 
the literature assumes as a fundamental, transhistorical element to political order, however, is 
conflict and warfare.  Second, while much of the literature is able to justify its applicability to 
previous transformations in political order, these reconciliations rely on a post hoc ergo propter 
hoc argument and thus cannot identify the antagonisms that led to fundamental systemic 
transformation.  One example of this logical fallacy is found in social constructivist accounts of 
political transformation, which paint a broad picture of transition in social epistemes but never 
identify any of the violent or antagonistic social relationships responsible for the birth of a new 
social language.  Similarly, Spruyt’s account of systems change provides a powerful multi-linear 
account of how political transformation occurs with massive speciation events in response to 
system-wide crisis, but never adequately establishes the basis of such a crisis in either the 
specific feudal case or any generic sense.  Finally, almost all of the theories provide an 
inadequate account of warfare, treating it as a subsidiary effect of the predominant method they 
isolate:  for realists, anarchy; for social constructivists, the entire spectrum of social 
epistemology; for neo-Marxists, property relations; and for the commercialization model, core-
periphery relations.  Even the geopolitical competition model, which treats war as the structuring 
variable in political transformation, considers the institution of warfare less as a social 
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phenomenon and more as the result of technology and tactics.  This oversimplification is what 
allows critics of warfare-driven models of political transformation to dismiss war as an 
interruption of social and political life rather than a fundamental social mode in and of itself. 
 Any theory of change in political organization that wants to maintain methodological 
coherence must have an explicit defense against the three objections listed above.  It is my 
contention that that treating change in the social constitution of warfare as the fundamental driver 
behind transformation in political organization rectifies these theoretical missteps.  First, 
organizing change around a social concept of warfare helps ease the tension between universality 
and historical change.  Where approaches centering on anarchy and the world-economy treat 
their framework as existing outside of history and determining its direction, a social theory of 
warfare merely provides a skeletal outline that is then substantiated by the historical and societal 
context war is conducted in.  Although war is a transhistorical constant, the conduct of war 
tactically, socially, and historically is drastically different across time.  Second, where social 
epistemic and commercialization theories never really account for the fundamental antagonisms 
underpinning change, a social theory of warfare is explicitly aimed at resolving the 
contradictions in each historical moment through a variety of temporal perspectives.  A 
traditional account of warfighting that only emphasizes the ‘what’ questions in the conduct of 
warfare, however, will be never be able to reconcile systems change to its conflictual causes.  
Consequently, bringing in social and historical ‘why’ questions to an analysis of warfare is 
essential to unravel the oppositional forces and identities that underpin the drive to transform the 
global system.  Finally, centering an account of political transformation on the institution of 
warfare better allows us to directly treat the often violent nature of change.  While an analysis of 
war will never be able to account for all of the interlocking variables constituting international 
50 
order—economics, religion, culture, et cetera—it does provide a compelling account for the 
various historical modes of political organization and the numerous transformation to new forms 
of order.  Warfare is the best lens through which to evaluate political transformation because it 
contains a rare balance between transhistorical applicability and historical specificity, material 
capabilities and social organization, structure and agency. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
OVERVIEW 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the literature concerning state formation suffers 
from three major problems—an overdetermination of change in variables that can never obtain 
universal historical veracity, an inability to identify and account for the antagonisms 
underpinning political transformation, and an inadequate account of warfare as a unique social 
phenomenon.  This chapter will attempt to lay out a theoretical argument that avoids these 
pitfalls and provides a cogent narrative for the transformation of war and its subsequent effect on 
political organization.  My fundamental argument is that while we cannot trace a unilinear, 
determinate path of political development across time and space, we can draw a developmental 
relationship between the transition to new modes of warfare and the subsequent rise of new 
political units.  Using Braudel’s three temporal spheres as a conceptual template, I combine 
Gilpin’s three modes of political change with Andrew Latham’s ‘warfighting paradigm’, ‘social 
mode of warfare’, and ‘historical structure of war’.  With each situated change in warfare, I 
argue for a necessary change in political organization at the same temporal level, and the 
possibility for political transformation at the next fundamental layer. 
Traditional accounts of political transformation tend to divide material and ideational 
considerations into two distinct fields of inquiry, operating independently of each other with one 
acting upon the other in a determinate fashion.  What these theories lack is any transhistorical 
means to bridge the gap between the substantive and the social.  It is my contention that war, 
understood as more than a technological or tactical phenomenon, provides an essential bridge 
between such social and material considerations.  Consequently, I argue that any approach that 
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hopes to bridge this ontological gap between material and social approaches ought to use war as 
the structuring theoretical principle.  Before my theoretical model can be given any credence, 
however, a prior step must be taken to elucidate the ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological foundations of my argument.  This chapter begins with a direct ontological 
inquiry, in which I elucidate the dual objects of inquiry (war and political organization) and 
establish how I will situate their change vis-à-vis other fundamental actors and processes.  I will 
then establish the epistemological basis of my theory, conceptually defining the state, war, and 
revolution.  Third, I will lay out the foundational methodology of my theory, drawing 
connections between Gilpin three modes of political transformation and Latham’s three modes of 
warfare.  Finally, I will answer potential criticisms of my method and demonstrate why an 
analysis of warfare provides the best avenue to analyze political transformation. 
 
THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
Examining the historical record, one is struck by the persistence of political conflict and 
violence.  Indeed, social organization from the beginning of human interaction seems indelibly 
marked with a dimension concerning warfare and collective security.20  The classical scholars of 
political theory and the state, from Hobbes to Rousseau, Bodin to Grotius, all considered the 
conduct of warfare and political violence as an inherent element within political order.  Despite 
the omnipresent effect of the institution of war on political organization, however, most modern 
scholars of state formation seem willing to bracket it off as a subsidiary response to some other 
fundamental cause or as an interruption of politics instead of their continuation.  Understanding 
                                                 
20
 Van Creveld (1999, 6-8) argues that while some isolated, primitive societies may have existed without the formal 
institution of war, instead focusing on ritualized clashes between individuals or no method of conflict at all, for most 
societies the raiding party and its institutionalized clashes with other cultures were a constitutive element to their 
lived history.  For an overview on the prevalence of war prior to complex society, see LeBlanc (2007). 
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the ontological character of war, consequently, is an essential first step to situating its role as 
either a constitutive or dependent variable in political transformation.  Any account of the nature 
of war can not help but begin with its most influential theorist, Carl von Clausewitz.  Out of his 
many theoretical insights into the nature of warfare, I will isolate a few which bear most readily 
on the fundamental character of war and political transformation.  For Clausewitz, war can be 
thought of in a trinitarian light consisting of primordial violence, the play of chance, and the 
subordination to policy-driven considerations (Clausewitz 2007, 30).21  This characteristic 
division of war emphasizes a few fundamental purposes of organized political violence that are 
crucial to war’s development as a substantive social phenomenon.  First, although war to 
Clausewitz reflects an inherent passion for violence within a social body, it is not a process that 
can be divorced from policy.  Instead, war becomes a properly social variable insofar as it 
represents another modality of political action—in the classical formulation “war is simply a 
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means” (Clausewitz 2007, 252).  
What the popular appropriation of this quote leaves out, however, is the explicit incorporation of 
warfare as another avenue of political action.  War cannot and should not be read as 
discontinuous with politics in the traditional sense; instead, it should be understood as another 
avenue of political action.  The effect of this move, according to Mary Kaldor, is that Clausewitz 
theorizes a mode of warfare analogous to the Marxist mode of production—a form of social 
practice and relations that is both constitutive and productive (Kaldor 1982).22 
 The second essential theoretical insight in Clausewitz concerns the nature of change in 
the mode of warfare.  Clausewitz isolates two fundamental visions of warfare—absolute war, 
                                                 
21
 Van Creveld’s (1991a, 1991b) association of trinitarian war with the people, the army and the government misses 
the crux of Clausewitz’s argument by arguing for the primacy of a tripartite system Clausewitz argues is derivative 
of the trinity of war’s characteristics described above.  For a detailed treatment of this argument, see Villacres and 
Bassford (1995). 
22
 See also Giddens (1985) for his discussion of warfare as a distinction constitutive factor within modernity. 
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which is an idealized model of complete and untrammeled violence that is never fully realized, 
and real war, which is the historically concretized form of warfare that tends toward absolute war 
but is always limited in attempts to achieve total destruction by frictional and political factors 
(Clausewitz 2007, 223-5).  As Latham persuasively argues, Clausewitz’s concept of real war is 
further differentiated into an objective and subjective character.  The objective character reflects 
aspects of war that are transhistorical and universal, “including its essence – ‘war is an act of 
force to compel our enemy to do our will’ - and its elemental characteristics, which included 
‘primordial violence’, ‘chance and probability’, the primacy of the political, the ‘fog of war’, and 
‘friction’”.  Contrasting this is the subjective, or transitory, character of war, which includes such 
elements as “weapons, tactics, the “art of war”, strategy and even the political context within 
which states fight wars” (Latham, forthcoming).  The essential dimension of war for scholars 
interested in change in the social mode of warfare and political organization consequently lies in 
this non-reified, subjective context.  Clausewitz, however, provides us with no theoretical 
scaffolding on which to conduct such an inquiry.  Consequently, Latham’s work is an attempt to 
create a basic theoretical diction upon which such a research agenda may be established.  
Drawing on the Braudelian understanding of temporal layers elucidated in Chapter 1, Latham 
establishes a treatment of warfare that accounts for the uneven development across tactical, 
social and historical measures, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.23 
 The first constitutive variable, corresponding to Braudel’s l’histoire événmentielle or 
events time, is what Latham terms the ‘warfighting paradigm’.  Put simply, the warfighting 
paradigm is the “specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines and organizational 
forms” that predominates at a given historical moment (Latham 2008, 120).  Transformation in  
                                                 
23
 While a rough sketch of these three temporal modes of war can be seen in Latham (2002), in which he attempts to 
apply a Braudelian method to the Revolution in Military Affairs, his later publications (2008, forthcoming) provide 
a much more nuanced and theoretically coherent treatment of these conceptual types. 
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Figure 2.1.  The Temporal Layers of Organized Political Violence.24 
 
Temporal Perspective Unit of Analysis Key Structural Elements 
Événmentielle Warfighting Paradigm 1. Military Technology 
2. Warfighting 
Tactics/Technique 
3. Military Organization 
Conjoncture Social Mode of Warfare 1. Preparation and 
Mobilization for Warfare 
2. Modalities of Warfare 
3. Social Experience of 
Warfare 
Longue Durée Historical Structure of 
War 
1.  Constitutive 
Antagonisms of World 
Order 
2.  Political Architecture 
of Organized Violence 
3. Institution of “War” 
 
the warfighting paradigm, however, cannot be reduced to a change in a single one of its 
constituent elements (respectively:  military technological advances, evolution in operational 
concepts and doctrines, and organizational innovation).  Instead, change in the warfighting 
paradigm constitutes a revolutionary transformation in the fundamental logics underpinning all 
of these elements and their relations to one another.  While technology advances will almost 
assuredly play an essential role in driving this transition, it is important not to leave out the 
equally constitutive role of human agency aimed at improving battlefield effectiveness.  The 
second constitutive vision of warfare, which operates at the level of conjoncture or episodic time, 
is what Latham describes as the ‘social mode of warfare’.  Briefly stated, the social mode of 
warfare is defined as “the way in which a state-society complex organizes for and conducts war” 
(Latham 2008, 127).  This mode of examining war is deeper and more foundational to the way 
war is conducted than the warfighting paradigm, looking to changes in the social, cultural, and 
technological forces that shape how society understands and orients itself toward war instead of 
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 Taken from Latham (forthcoming). 
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how it conducts it.  Unlike the warfighting paradigm, the social mode of warfare operates both 
on and off the battlefield, functioning as a distinct societal logic during both war and peace; 
during conflict and after its resolution.  The final constitutive account of warfare, operating at the 
level of the longue durée or epochal time, is what Latham describes as the ‘historical structure of 
war’, or “the prevailing configuration of social relations, ideas and institutions that define the 
basic nature of ‘war’ in any given world order” (Latham 2008, 128).  This vision of warfare 
analyzes its most fundamental character, focusing on the constitutive antagonisms of world order 
(the violently-constituted conflictual relationships that form the possibility of violence), the 
political architecture of organized violence (the infrastructure of political violence, both in its 
material units and the structural matrix in which they are embedded)  and the fundamental 
institution of war (the prevailing system of meaning containing the ontology, moral purpose and 
meaning of political violence).  Each prevailing logic operates at its own speed, with the 
warfighting paradigm rapidly changing as technological and strategic innovation supplant and 
fuse with status quo methods of warmaking, the social mode of warfare changing more 
gradually, and the historical structure of war representing a deep foundation that from the 
perspective of a situated observer appears to represent the eternal nature of warfare. 
 In a similar fashion to the transhistorical ontological existence of war in world order, 
political organization is something that exists across time and space as an indelible element of 
human social practice.  Whether bound up with the positive administration of power as in 
Mann’s account or a necessary consequence of corporate social identity as in Van Creveld’s, 
what seems self-evident is the constitutive role that forms of political organization have played in 
the makeup of social bodies (Mann 1986, 6-8; Van Creveld 1999, 1-2).  It is important, however, 
to take a step back and examine how societies exist and interact across a broad spectrum of 
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organizational practice and ideational belief.  Instead of attempting to draw a fixed picture of 
social relations in this irreducible social totality, Robert Cox argues we should distinguish 
between concepts of ‘world order’ and ‘international order’.  Drawing on Ibn Khaldun and 
Hedley Bull, Cox defines world order as “genuinely transhistorical.  It refers to the order 
prevailing in all mankind, without prejudging the manner in which mankind is institutionalized” 
(Cox 1996, 149).  World order represents the sum of all human actions and interactions – it is 
quite literally the social totality, those core elements of human existence that are absolutely 
essential.  Contrasted with this perspective is one of international order, which refers to “a 
particular historically limited condition of institutionalization: [for example,] that of a system of 
nation states” (Cox 1996, 149).  Any attempt to do comparative or transformational analysis of 
world order must necessarily focus not on world order itself, because of its static and eternal 
essence, but should focus instead on the articulation of specific spheres of social organization in 
their particular historical and institutional forms.  If the object of inquiry is the change in 
political organization against the backdrop of fundamental world order, however, a specific 
model to ontologically distinguish forms of change over time is still required.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2.2, the application of Gilpin’s three modes of change to the Braudelian model of 
temporal layers provides an excellent framework through which to theorize change in political 
organization.25 
 The first type of change in political organization, corresponding to the événmentielle, is 
what Gilpin terms interaction change.  This form of change is relatively limited and occurs quite 
frequently, reflecting shifts in diplomatic posture and policy; actor interface and relations.  
Transformation in these interactional forms, while able to fundamentally alter the day-to-day  
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 Spruyt (1994) deftly elucidates Gilpin and Braudel’s arguments, but never takes the next logical step to synthesize 
their methods.  I contend that this combination is essential to theorize change in international political organization. 
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Figure 2.2.  The Temporal Layers of International Political Transformation. 
 
Temporal Perspective Unit of Analysis Key Structural Elements 
Événmentielle Interaction Change 1.  Modifies international 
practices and policies  
2.  Changes diplomatic 
strategies, actor relations 
Conjoncture Systemic Change 1. Shifts the distribution 
of power (hegemonic 
transition) 
2. Maintains the 
overriding logic and order 
within the system  
Longue Durée Systems Change 1. Alters the fundamental 
nature of the institutional 
order 
2. Changes the dominant 
unit type 
 
operations of a given form of political organization, has little effect on the structuring boundary 
conditions of the system itself.  The second form of change, corresponding to the conjonctore, 
bears more readily on the structure of the system, albeit indirectly.  In what Gilpin terms 
systemic change, the power relations between states are altered through hegemonic transition 
wars.  The result of this leadership transition is the delegitimization of the ruling principles of the 
old hegemon and the creation of a new ruling consensus, which in turn opens space for changes 
in the operation of the system.  What this sort of transition does not alter, however, are the 
underlying logics and structures that determine the privileged unit in international politics.  
Revolutionary challenges to these structural principles, which correspond to the longue durée, 
are the prerequisite for Gilpin’s third conceptual type, ‘systems change’.  According to Gilpin, 
systems change is an extremely rare, non-cyclical process that fundamentally alters what 
constitutes the predominant actor-type in the international system.  This kind of change is 
extremely rare precisely because it challenges what to embedded observers seems 
unchallengeable—the very mode of political organization under which each and every individual 
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subject operates.  Just as subjects of feudal rule likely had great difficulty conceiving of their 
identity apart from parochial political structures, so too do subjects of the modern state have 
difficulty imagining identity absent state and national markers.  While Gilpin provides the basis 
for a multi-causal model of change in political organization across temporal modes, he does so 
trapped in the conceptual schema of the anarchy problematique.  Only by jettisoning the 
ahistorical baggage of neorealism and fusing his conceptual types with a Braudelian analysis are 
the radical implications of Gilpin’s multi-temporal model of change revealed. 
 
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
No less important than establishing the objects of warfare and political organization or the world 
order against which they change is defining the language I use to theorize and describe them.  As 
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith persuasively argue, inquiry into ontology is only possible after we 
determine an epistemic basis on which to divide up the ontological realm (Hollis and Smith 
1996, 111-116).  The first term I will conceptually unpack and analyze is the ‘state’.  Of the three 
concepts this chapter will address, the state seems to be the least directly connected to my 
theoretical argument.  Nothing could be further from the truth, however.  Although my 
theoretical argument is generalized to changes in political organization across time and space, the 
historical and contemporary inquiries of Chapter 3 deal with the transformation into and the 
potential exit from the modern state and the modern state system.  As a consequence, unraveling 
the meaning of the state is essential to my argument.  What exactly the state entails on both a 
definitional and functional level has been a subject for debate throughout the history of historical 
sociology and international relations.  Max Weber’s foundational definition of the state is 
premised on a central sovereign authority’s control over the means of legitimate, organized 
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violence within its territorial borders.  Wendt capably sums up this basic Weberian definition of 
the state as “an organization possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence 
within a society” (Wendt 2003, 20-21).  Wendt identifies four operative components within this 
definition that must each be analyzed as distinct compositional elements comprising the state.  
The first is the monopoly of force, defined by Wendt not merely in terms of the capability to 
defend the state’s interests but rather as a unified and centrally controlled “common power” able 
to sustain the given sociopolitical order.  Wendt’s second operative term is legitimacy.  This does 
not necessarily entail equality and recognition for all members of a given state society, but 
instead requires an acceptance of the state as a guarantor for society.  Such a definition precludes 
gangsters and warlords who nominally control the central means of authority but who are not 
recognized by society at large as legitimate rulers.  The third operative phrasing within Wendt is 
sovereignty, which he conceptualizes in Schmittian terms as exclusive territorial authority, or the 
unilateral ability to exclude and kill members of the community.  The final operative measure of 
Wendt’s definition is its existence as a corporate actor, meaning it acts with a single, consistent 
identity in its dealings with other political forces and does not devolve authority in international 
matters to sub-state actors. 
 As Martin Shaw argues, however, articulating the state in the terms established by Weber 
assumes an ideal, bureaucratic type that does not adequately reflect modernity (Shaw 2000a, 
43).26  In a corollary critique, Shaw illustrates that this vision of states is historically inconsistent 
because it presumes the national/international divide as a sort of ontological prerequisite to any 
political organization.  As the example of the Hanseatic League demonstrates, we cannot create 
convenient bundles of nationality within the state and distinguish them against a world of 
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 Shaw argues the classical Weberian definition of the state actually goes a step beyond most appropriations of it 
and assumes the existence of formalistic bureaucracies that are proven historically atypical by the work of Gramsci 
and Foucault. 
61 
external difference.  Michael Mann’s definition of the state provides an interesting corrective to 
these perceived shortcomings.  While agreeing with much if not most of the analysis contained in 
Weber and Wendt, Mann makes his definition of the state much more contingent, arguing that 
“1.  The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel  2.  embodying centrality, in the 
sense that political relations radiate to and from a centre, to cover a  3.  territorially demarcated 
area over which it exercises  4.  some degree of authoritarian, binding rule making, backed up by 
some organized political force” (Mann 1993, 55).  But while such a definition eliminates some 
deficiencies and limitations of the Weberian model, Mann goes too far and eliminates much of 
the heuristic value of Weber’s definition.  While there is certainly some truth to the claims that 
the Weberian definition of the state is historically imperfect, it provides a much more analytical 
distinction between state and non-state actors.  As Wendt persuasively argues, to accept Shaw 
and Mann’s call to eliminate the monopoly of violence requirement would eliminate any and all 
rigor from the definition of the state, long ago placing us in a de facto global state (Wendt 2003, 
23).  Accepting a less contingent definition, however, does not mean that the state always looked 
exactly like the ideal bureaucratic form described by Weber—instead, the four requirements that 
Wendt establishes can elucidate the boundary conditions for the modern state as a political form. 
At this point it is worthwhile to take a step back and examine the concept of war in a 
similar definitional light.  Shaw cites Clausewitz’s operational characterization of war as an act 
of force to get an enemy to submit to our will that has no escalatory limits until it is satisfied 
(Shaw 2000a, 60).  If we accept that the practice of war occurs against the same social 
background as the practice of politics, with warfare’s preparation for conflict, acquisition of 
material, and military structure forming its own discrete social constellation, it no longer makes 
sense to conceptualize war as an interruption to normal social life.  Instead, we should envision 
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outbreaks of conflict as the elevation of warfare’s particular mode of knowledge to a primary 
position in the social sphere more generally, with other realms like politics and economics taking 
a backseat to the logics of war.  As Shaw argues, the extant conceptual confusion lies in the 
attempt to distinguish militarism as some form of social structure from war as an exceptional act 
that merely continues politics in another way.  Shaw instead ascertains a dialectical paradox in 
warfare reflected in the divide between social and strategic analyses of it.  Namely, while 
warfare is part of, and consequently cannot be analyzed outside of, the broad social processes 
which constitute the basic building blocks of social organization, its dynamics and constituent 
elements are unique and irreducible to any other aspect of society (Shaw 1988, 11).  This tension 
between warfare and society goes beyond their mutual constitution—the fulfillment of the aims 
of war in an absolute sense means the death of the social body.  The ends of war and society are 
inherently opposed.  At the same time, however, war and society are inseparable, interactive 
human conditions that evolve alongside one another.  In light of this contrast, Shaw argues that 
we must alter the very way we talk about the war-society relationship.  There can be no 
analytical distinction in our grammar – “we are talking about the role of socialised warfare in a 
militarised economy and society” (Shaw 1988, 24, emphasis in original). 
 The third mobilizing term that must be elucidated is “revolution”.  Implicit in my analysis 
of change across the temporal modes of warfare and political organization is the concept of a 
rapid, revolutionary transition.  What exactly constitutes this revolution, however, is a matter of 
some debate.  Leading theorist Theda Skocpol, in her work States and Social Revolutions, 
distinguishes between social revolutions and political revolutions.  For Skocpol, social 
revolutions “…are rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures; and they 
are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below” while political 
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revolutions “…transform state structures but not social structures, and […] are not necessarily 
accomplished through class conflict” (Skocpol 1979, 4).  Political revolutions create major 
changes within the governmental system they occur in, but do not fundamentally alter the social 
scaffolding that the political framework as a whole rests upon.  In many ways, this argument is 
analytically similar to the classical Marxist conception of base and superstructure, in which 
political revolutions may make large surface level changes, but still reflect largely the same 
social reality that existed prior to the political re-ordering.  Social revolutions, then, are not 
merely re-orderings of the coordinates of social interaction, but instead actively transform the 
relationship between political order and society, challenging even the most fundamental 
connections between the two. 
 While the social and political revolutions Skocpol discusses provide an essential step 
towards a holistic theory of revolution, the exclusive focus on national and state-based revolution 
severely limits the scope of inquiry.  As Shaw argues, most contemporary theories of revolution 
cannot account for the fact that the international system plays a constitutive role in the conduct of 
revolution.  As a result, study of past revolutions is only half complete—while much scholarship 
has been dedicated to the impact of revolution at the national level and the international context 
against which revolution occurred, relatively little research has been conducted concerning the 
direct effect of revolution on the global political system.  Fred Halliday, in his book Revolution 
in World Politics, attempts to account for this missing element by applying Skocpol’s principles 
to the international system.  Arguing that all revolutions occur against an international 
background and possess (either implicitly or explicitly) international aims, Halliday concludes 
that the role of revolution on international structure is direct and constitutive.  “The history of the 
international system is […] marked by a cycle of dissolution and recomposition, attendant on the 
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incidence of internationalized revolutionary crises and their supersession. (Halliday 2005, 206).  
Contra Skocpol, Halliday argues that the impact of revolution far outstrips the effect on states 
and their policies – we must instead examine how revolution affects the very structure of the 
international system.   
Perhaps the most valuable contribution made by Halliday is to problematize the very 
character of revolution as a static transformative process.  There is no transhistorical character of 
revolution.  It is always characterized by “the forms it takes, the forces it mobilizes, the 
outcomes it has” (Halliday 2005, 4).  To substantiate this argument, Shaw contends that the 
transition from the 20th to the 21st century reflects a unique “global revolution” in which the very 
nature of state-society relations has been irrevocably altered (Shaw 2000a, 16-7).  Shaw’s 
periodization of the beginning of global revolution in the modern shift in state relations, 
however, radically de-historicizes the evolution of revolution by positing this ‘unique’ global 
revolution against a static notion of pre-global revolution.  Halliday’s account of revolution is 
much more decisive insofar as it refuses to make any static periodizations or fix any essential 
character to revolution.  Drawing on, and to a large extent fusing, the arguments advanced by 
Skocpol and Halliday, I argue that revolution is constituted at both a domestic and international 
level, and provides a fundamental challenge to social order from top to bottom. 
 
THE METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
If the ontological account establishes the objects of my inquiry as warfare and political 
organization and sets them against the field of world order, and the epistemological account 
establishes the language I’ll use to discuss these objects, the methodological aspect of my theory 
must synthesize these variables into a consistent narrative.  Before establishing the relation  
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Figure 2.3.  The Nested Relationship between Temporal Modes. 
 
 
between warfare and political organization across time and space, however, it’s essential to 
understand the interconnections and discontinuities of the Braudelian temporal phases.  Although 
these three temporal spheres interact with each other through both upward and downward 
causation, in a given historical moment they assume a fixed relationship to one another, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.3.27  The basis of all inquiries into history start with the world order, the 
fundamental and eternal basis upon which all subsequent human action is written.  If world order 
is the unchanging basis upon which specific institutions are built, the longue durée represents the 
specific broad historical patterns of action and interaction that configure actors within world 
order.  Very little can be taken for granted in this broad institutional mode; both the nature of 
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 This understanding of the relationship between temporal modes draws upon the idea of nested generative 
structures in a ‘temporal holism’ as argued in Latham (forthcoming).  For more discussion on the relationship of 
Braudelian temporal layers, see Braudel (1982, 26); Ruggie (1998a, 141); and Reus-Smit (1999, 15). 
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actors and the stage they act upon (systems change) and the type of actions the international 
order provides for them to take (the historical structure of war) are open to change in the 
transition from one epoch to the next.  As a subset of longue durée analysis, the conjunctural 
temporal mode is configured within the broad institutional structure of a given historical epoch.  
Inside these structuring rules, however, there is a great deal of room for variation in both the 
structures of political leadership and international norms (systemic change) and the way societies 
relate to the cultural, economic and technological dimensions of war as an embedded practice 
(the social mode of warfare).  Finally, subsidiary to both the conjunctural mode and the longue 
durée are the relations of the événmentielle, which are both the fastest to change and the least 
consequential to the broad function of the system.  Each new political and interactive 
development (interaction change) or technological or tactical advance (warfighting paradigm) 
changes the practices of the system without changing the fundamental social relations or broader 
structure.   The relationship between these temporal modes resembles the Russian matryoshka 
doll, with each move toward a faster temporal analysis revealing an independent subfield 
prefigured by the institutional coordinates of the deeper temporal layers.   
 While this nested historical analysis mostly concerns itself with processes of downward 
causation, where the system’s deep structural rules establish the constitutional basis for faster 
temporal transitions, under-theorized are the opposite processes of upward causation.28  It is my 
contention that these upward processes are the essential driver of revolutionary change in 
political organization.  My argument follows from the following fundamental premise:  because 
collective survival is never guaranteed and relations of violence are a constitutive human 
condition, political organization responds directly to changes in the structure and organization of 
warfare.  This developmental relationship has two modalities of change.  The first, which I term  
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 For a more detailed treatment of upward and downward causation, see the Chapter 1 section on Alexander Wendt. 
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Figure 2.4.  The Constitutive Transformation of War and Political Organization. 
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‘necessary change’, indicates the direct and inevitable transformation in political organization as 
a consequence of a change in warfare within the same temporal phase.  Because political 
violence constitutes a major risk to the continued function of social institutions, political 
organization is fine-tuned to changes in the practice of warfare and will quickly adapt to new 
developments in the same temporal mode.  Alongside the necessary change that operates within 
temporal phases is what I term ‘permissive change’, or the possibility for upward transformation 
in political organization stemming from changes in a dependent mode of warfare.  Just as change 
in the practices and principles of warfare demands a subsequent change in political organization 
at the same level, the new set of conflictual practices and relations entailed in the new mode of 
warfare open the possibility for a deeper transformation in the modes and organizing principles 
of a given polity. 
To analyze this account, I will start with changes situated at the fastest temporal mode, 
the événmentielle.  When a change in the warfighting paradigm occurs, often with the invention 
of a new weapon system or the institution of a new tactical approach to the battlefield, changes in 
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interactional practice necessarily must follow.  Examples abound, from the institution of standing 
military forces, which necessitated states to create codes of international military conduct, to the 
development of radar, which necessitated different forms of communication both inside a state’s 
institutional structures and between allies who needed to share tactical information, and finally to 
the development of the atomic bomb, which made communication among rival nuclear states 
necessary and led to the creation of institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency.  
While these changes in the warfighting paradigm necessitate interactional responses, however, 
hegemonic transition is only revealed as a possibility.  While in some cases the development of 
new technologies and tactics has led directly to systemic change and hegemonic reorganization 
(think here of England’s adoption of sea power tactics and the subsequent Pax Brittanica, or the 
United States’ development of a nuclear capability and its unchallenged global supremacy 
immediately following World War II), such a change doesn’t follow by necessity.  It’s much 
more likely that the hegemon will find a way to accommodate these changes within the larger 
social structures of war, making a fundamental systemic transformation unnecessary.  With each 
change in the constituted practices of the warfighting paradigm, however, an opportunity for 
systemic change arises.  Finally, developments in the warfighting paradigm have little to no 
direct effect at the level of the system itself.  For changes in warfighting practices to affect what 
constitutes the dominant unit type, they must first effect a change at the conjunctural level, 
instituting a new social mode of war or establishing a new hegemonic balance. 
 Moving to an analysis of the conjoncture, we find the possibility for even more 
fundamental change in political organization.  As a new social mode of warfare emerges, with 
attendant changes to the cultural, economic and technological relationship societies take towards 
warfare in toto, a direct change occurs in the systemic political order.  Again, examples of these 
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forms of change are prevalent, including the transition from neoclassical war to what Shaw terms 
‘Industrialized Total Warfare’, which shifted the hegemonic balance towards those states best 
able to mobilize economic and social production towards the machinery of warfare, and the 
transition between the grinding, cost-averse form of war motivated by the nuclear revolution and 
what Kaldor terms the ‘new wars’ framework, where a devolution in both aims and arms has 
threatened the tactical superiority and hegemony of traditional great powers (Shaw 1991, 21; 
Kaldor 2007, 11).  Through the process of downward causation, the dominant aspects of the 
warfighting paradigm and the interactional political model are reconfigured within this new 
conjunctural mode.  Transition from one social mode to another also opens the possibility for a 
fundamental change in the very coordinates of the system itself.  The best example of this form 
of transition can be seen in the historical move away from ad hoc force structures to a well 
trained and supplied standing military unit.  The transition to a permanent social mode of 
warfare, embedding military aims into the very fabric of the social body, necessitated the 
transformation of political order around a new form of political organization, the sovereign state.  
This argument will be treated in much more detail in Chapter 3. 
 Attempting to theorize revolutionary breaks in institutional political order from macro-
level structuring principles down ignores the fundamental and constitutive role that smaller order 
revolutionary thought and action play in the creation of new forms and the territorial division of 
political organization. At the same time we must recognize the interlocking relationship between 
system-wide historical structure, subsequent episodes of social history, and surface-level events 
and processes, we must also acknowledge that revolutionary thought and action emerge through 
processes of upward causation from change in the operational and social aspects of warfare.  
Because violence is and remains a primary concern for the social body, political organization 
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will always have to deal with evolutions in the means and methods of organized political 
violence.  Attempts to provide a comprehensive account of transformation in political 
organization must account for both the constitutive dimension of warfare and the vital role of 
revolution from below. 
 
CRITIQUE 
A number of potential objections to the theoretical model I have established immediately jump to 
mind.  First and foremost, a critic of my model could potentially argue that despite my careful 
argument for the lack of definite and determine patterns of causality throughout history, my 
theoretical model ultimately falls into the same deterministic trap.  Taken as a whole, however, I 
do not think this criticism pertains to my theoretical argument.  While I do critique models of 
change in political organization that assume a static variable throughout human history as the 
driver of all institutional formation, like neorealism’s assertion of causal anarchy or the 
commercialization model’s belief in an essential world-economy, my model doesn’t attain the 
same calcification for three reasons.  First, in my analysis of the different ways war operates, I 
am careful not to ascribe to war any essential character outside of the use of organized violence 
to compel some action or change on an external agent.  While war always concerns conflictual 
and violent relations between polities, it doesn’t necessarily do so in a certain pattern or essential 
mode.  This flexible concept of war allows different forms of conflict throughout history to 
inform my theory, and also avoids the unilinear, teleological narrative of war implicit in 
Deudney’s account.  Second, my theory doesn’t presume that warfare and political organization 
flow from a single model globally.  Vast differences in polities and their violent relations exist 
and have existed not just across time, but also across space.  Especially in examining historical 
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institutions, I am careful to present institutional systems in political order and warfare as just a 
few among many.  As we move toward a more contemporary frame of analysis, a unified global 
mode of investigation appears to be more readily explicable.  Even in this global system, 
however, I note the uneven character of development, especially because it provides insight into 
the possibility of revolutionary systemic change.  Finally, while my model describes how 
political organization changes, it doesn’t make claims concerning what end that evolution is 
directed toward.  There is no endpoint of violent relations towards which war develops.  Instead, 
warfare reflects a specific constellation of technological, social, and historical variables that 
attain at a given moment and in turn structure the form and content of political organization. 
 A second critique of my method might argue that I have misstated the constitutive 
connection between warfare and political organization.  To substantiate my belief that there is a 
constitutive link between warfare and political organization, I would argue that the question of 
societal survival in an uncertain and violent world has been the central organizing principle 
reflected in both the empirical record and the vast majority of political theory throughout history.  
Variously represented as anarchy, the state of nature, and the insecurity paradox, this 
constitutively violent relationship, which Deudney systematizes into the concept of violence-
interdependence, is one that affects all social communities after they come into contact with 
another society.  A critic might retort that if violence is the fundamental constitutive element in 
political organization, my theory cannot account for countries that have abandoned their 
militaries altogether.  This objection poses an interesting quandary for my argument – does a 
society have to maintain some aspect of warfare?  Despite the elimination of their military 
forces, however, I would argue that these countries still operate socially and structurally in 
patterns of warfare.  Implicit in the abolition of the means of warfare is the belief that should a 
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state threaten or attack their polity, another state will step in to provide for their defense.  
Additionally, states without a military still participate in international structures that address how 
modern security concerns operate.  Fundamentally, I would argue that this ability to eliminate 
formal military structures is part and parcel of a broad institutional arrangement of war that 
allows states to feel secure under another state’s military umbrella.  Finally, it is not as if these 
states have abandoned all forms of coercion.  They still maintain national police bodies and the 
ability to mobilize against domestic threats, which could be argued to function in the same way 
as a standing military, only absent the full scope of weaponry and tactics. 
 Related to this critique is an argument claiming that I’ve reversed the relationship 
between political organization and warfare.  Such an objection might argue that the reason we 
see developments in the practices and structures of warfare tactically, socially and structurally is 
a result of concomitant changes in the form of social organization.  This argument, however, 
doesn’t hold much conceptual weight.  First, it is difficult to envision processes of revolutionary 
change in political organization that aren’t rooted in mutually constituted relations of violence.  
One could potentially argue that the possibility for institutional transformation without violent 
action is possible in contemporary society, but even allowing this clarification the theory seems 
to leave out a broad swath of history.  Second, if we understand political organization as 
concerning itself with the maintenance of social order, it is difficult to envision how changes in 
political organization even happen.  In other words, there’s no fundamental reason why change 
in political organization ever occurs.  The lack of any consistent motivating pattern behind 
change is a major disadvantage to this theoretical model.  Finally, it is difficult to conceptualize 
how changes in interactions between states drive technological and tactical advancements on the 
battlefield, which the reverse seems at least conceivable.  Changes in the diplomatic posture of 
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and relations between states in no way implicate the development of new tools of war.  A theory 
centering on changes in political organization would have to eliminate, or at the very least 
ignore, this constitutive dimension. 
 Finally, a critic could argue that in centering my analysis on war, I have focused too 
heavily on material considerations at the expense of ideational change.  While this criticism is 
true of the geopolitical competition model, which focuses entirely on the technology of war and 
its material aims, I have made a conscious effort to use a social theory of war that includes both 
its material and ideational aspects.  War must not only be understood as a consequence of the 
weaponry and material involved, but also as a deeply embedded cultural phenomenon that has an 
effect on every part of society.  While there is perhaps an argument to be made that my theory 
eliminates the role of Habermasian analyses of communicative interaction, I would argue that 
these pure forms of discourse have never existed, and if they have, it is impossible to conceive of 
them absent the implicit role of violence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 If we are to understand the constitutional role that transformation in war plays on 
alterations in the fundamental nature of political order, we must have a grasp of the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological implications of such a theory.  Ontologically, this chapter 
relies on a Braudelian temporal model to divide organized political violence and international 
political transformation into three modes of analysis.  Corresponding to the fastest temporal 
mode, that of events or the l’histoire événmentielle, are the ‘warfighting paradigm’ and 
‘interaction change’.  These modes reflect the function and day-to-day practices that constitute 
the larger field of inquiry in which they operate:  for the warfighting paradigm, the technology 
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and tactics of battlefield combat; for interactions change, the relations and diplomatic posture of 
actors vis-à-vis one another.  Corresponding to the next temporal layer, that of periods or the 
conjonctore, are the ‘social mode of warfare’ and ‘systemic change’.  These modes indicate the 
general order that the rules of the system have manifested: for the social mode of warfare, the 
general constellation of cultural, economic, and technological relations war entails; for systemic 
change, the general hegemonic balance in the international system.  Finally, corresponding to the 
slowest temporal mode, that of broad historical epochs or the longue durée, are the ‘historical 
structure of war’ and ‘systems change’.  These modes represent the most fundamental 
constitutive principles of institutional order:  for the historical structure of war, the very 
constitutive antagonisms, political architecture, and concept of war; for systems change, the 
predominant political unit-type.  All of these ontological types existed across a fundamental 
backdrop of world order, or those constitutive characteristics fundamentally bound up with 
human social existence. 
 Epistemologically, this chapter isolates three mobilizing terms and attempts to provide a 
working definition of them for use in my theory.  First, I examine the generic concept of the 
‘state’.  Concluding that Weber had it mostly right, I argue (against Mann’s contingent 
definition) that we should understand the state through the corrective boundary conditions that 
Wendt establishes as constitutive to statehood.  Second, I examine the epistemic construction of 
war and warfare.  Beginning with the Clausewitzian understanding of war as the use of force to 
make an enemy submit to our will, I draw upon Shaw’s insight on the social dimension of war, 
concluding that war must be understood as a fundamentally social phenomenon.  Finally, I 
examine the concept of revolution, beginning with Skocpol’s analysis of social revolutions, 
which aim at changing the fundamental conditions underpinning society, and political 
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revolutions, which change the mode of politics but not the social order that underpins them.  
While I agree with Skocpol’s characterization of revolution in the domestic context, I draw on 
Halliday to argue that revolution also has an explicit international character. 
 Methodologically, this chapter begins by arguing that Braudel’s temporal phases should 
not be understood as ontologically distinct spheres, but instead as progressively nested in one 
another.  Each temporal mode operates against a backdrop of relations configured by the deeper 
temporal layers.  I then move on to argue that constitutive changes in the nature of warfare as 
situated in the different temporal modes directly create the conditions for change in political 
organization.  I rely on two modes of change to describe the relationship of change within 
temporal layers and across temporal layers.  The first mode of change, which I call ‘necessary 
change’, occurs within a temporal layer and is a direct and necessary transformation of political 
order in response to a concomitant change the practice or structure of warfare.  The second mode 
of change, which I call ‘permissive change’, operates across temporal layers and argues that a 
change in a dependent mode of warfare has the potential to alter the deeper structures of political 
organization on which it rests.  I argue, against potential critiques of my method, that this model 
allows for the best understanding of changes in political organization and functions as an 
ontological bridge between purely material and purely ideational understandings of both warfare 
and political organization. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONSTITUTED MILITARY TRANSITIONS, PAST AND PRESENT 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter will address the transition between European feudalism and the modern state system 
and the potential transition from the modern state system to new forms of political organization 
from a theoretical perspective connecting developments in warfare to constitutively-oriented 
transformations in political organization.  Examining the Military Revolution in detail, I illustrate 
processes of upward causation rooted in changes in the technologies and social practices of 
warfare, which culminated historically in sovereign territoriality as the predominant form of 
political organization.  I begin by looking at changes in the warfighting paradigm; specifically, 
the technological developments related to the emergence of gunpowder, mobile capital ships and 
the artillery fortress and the tactical development toward an infantry-driven force posture.  These 
innovations are then tied to changes in interaction strategies pursued by different polities and 
changes in the systemic organization of political actors across the continent.  Next, I examine 
how the move away from ad hoc military structures towards standing forces is indicative of a 
shift in the social mode of warfare, unpacking the interconnected cultural, economic and 
technological developments such a transformation entailed.  I then examine the interconnections 
between this transformation in the social mode of warfare and the subsequent reorganization of 
the systemic balance of power.  Finally, I examine whether this social shift altered the very 
nature of the European system of political organization and the implications such a transition 
potentially posed for the broader political system. 
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 Moving on the modern context of war and political organization, I begin by analyzing the 
revolution in military technology away from high-yield weaponry toward crude and inexpensive 
small arms and explosives.  I then relate this to the warfighting paradigm, arguing that this 
technological shift has stymied the traditional Western way of war and necessitated the 
development of a new warfighting model aimed at fighting focused, high-intensity conflicts 
against non-traditional military opponents.  Next, I use the work of Herfried Münkler to examine 
the consequences this shift has had on interaction strategies, specifically examining the rise of 
non-state actors and their integration into diplomatic channels.  I also address how 
transformation in the speed and conduct of military operations has fundamentally altered the 
organizational structure of militaries at war.  I then examine the consequences this shift in the 
warfighting paradigm entails for the systemic balance of power, arguing that it could potentially 
be hazardous to the continued exercise of global power.  Next, I examine the consequences of the 
shift in the conduct of war on the social mode of warfare, arguing that within the new war 
paradigm, violence is no longer constituted around states but rather around identity groups.  
Drawing on Mary Kaldor and Mark Duffield, I investigate the consequences of this downward 
shift in the social mode of warfare on the systemic balance of power and the global system as a 
whole.  Finally, drawing on Phil Cerny, I examine the possibilities for a neo-medieval transition 
to account for the changing nature of warfare. 
 
FEUDAL TRANSITION IN THE WARFIGHTING PARADIGM 
While the precise chronology of the Military Revolution is very much in question, what the 
literature seems to consistently support is the fundamental transformation in the technology and 
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tactical organization of warfighting.29  I will begin by discussing the transformation in the 
technological aspect of the warfighting paradigm.  Geoffrey Parker argues for three main 
technological advances that drove warfare in a new revolutionary direction:  the naval supremacy 
of the capital ship’s ‘broadside’, the creation of gunpowder artillery and weaponry, and the 
development of the ‘artillery fortress’ as a response to the increasing role of gunpowder-based 
warfare (Parker 1996, 159).30  The development of capital naval vessels with the ability to 
withdraw their cannons into the ship on truck carriages for quick reloading allowed fleets to 
sustain ranged conflict over prolonged periods.  This in turn completely shifted the tactical 
environment in which naval combat operated—no longer were ships made and crews trained for 
strategies of ramming and boarding.  Instead, highly trained bombardiers able to fire 
consecutively throughout combat came to dominate naval skirmishes, and completely altered the 
makeup of navies across Europe.  Smaller, longer range galleons gradually came to replace the 
massive, short-range flagships of the previous paradigm (Parker 1996, 95).  Although this 
method of retreating from boarding action was considered unchivalrous by naval adversaries 
participating in the old paradigm, the tactic was so effective that it eventually supplanted prior 
methods of engagement entirely. Nimble, rapidly firing fleets decimated navies built around 
massive, dreadnaught-style vessel construction.  The result was a fundamental transformation in 
the composition and conduct of naval warfighting. 
Similarly, the gunpowder revolution completely changed the methods of land-based 
conflict by altering both the scope and speed of conflict.  As Parker demonstrates, embedded 
                                                 
29
 While Roberts (1956) places the chronology of the Military Revolution in the century between 1560 and 1660, 
recent challenges to this chronology have emerged.  For alternate versions of the transformation, see Black (1991), 
who argues military change occurred over a period of centuries spanning form 1550 to 1800, and Rogers (1994), 
who argues for a punctuated equilibrium model of military development. 
30
 Brian Downing (1992) argues that the role of gunpowder is overstated vis-à-vis the role of the pike in determining 
transformation.  Regardless, there is a clear movement in the nature of siege warfare with the gunpowder revolution, 
which transformed in a very fundamental manner the structures of war.  For more on the shift to siege artillery, see 
Black (1991, 8-9); Contamine (1984, 200-7); and Porter (1994). 
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observers witnessed a transformation in the very practice of warfighting towards the use of 
massive siege technology: 
The verdict of Andreas Bernaldez on the conquest of Granada in the 1480s – ‘Great 
towns, which once would have held out a year against all foes but hunger, now fell within 
a month’ – was echoed by Niccolo Machiavelli concerning the French invasion of Italy in 
the 1490s: ‘No wall exists, however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in but a few days.’ 
(Parker 1996, 164) 
In 1509, soldier, diplomat and historian Francesco Guicciardini argued that after the gunpowder 
revolution “[w]ars became sudden and violent, conquering and capturing a state in less time than 
it used to take to occupy a village; cities were reduced with great speed, in a manner of days and 
hours rather than months, battles became savage and bloody in the extreme” (Parker 1996, 160).  
Warfighting transitioned towards strategies of forward deployment, with lengthy supply lines 
necessary to maintain the material and armament for further action.  The military benefits of such 
an approach, however, were startling.  Within a single of day of reaching a city, attackers could 
set up cannon and launch up to a thousand rounds at an enemy stronghold (Contamine 1984, 
201).   Quantitatively, the use of artillery exploded throughout the fifteenth century, with 
thousands of cannons and hundreds of thousands of pounds of powder stored by powers both 
great and small (Contamine 1984, 147-150).  The gunpowder revolution also occurred at the 
level of individual soldiers, with efficient arquebuses and muskets gradually replacing the 
crossbow in the early sixteenth century (Black 1991, 8-9).   The effectiveness of arquebuses 
against pikemen led to the dual use of firearms and pikes, both of which eventually fused 
together in the development of the socket bayonet (Downing 1992, 66).  The marked 
improvement in effectiveness these tactics entailed led to a widespread shift to their 
implementation across Europe, and the vast expense of maintaining large armies based on these 
new technologies posed major difficulties for smaller polities throughout the region. 
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 As a response to the effectiveness of the transition from trebuchets to gunpowder-based 
artillery, defensive structures were forced to transition from traditional castles to artillery 
fortresses hardened against such attacks.  As Downing argues, “[d]evelopments in gunpowder 
and field pieces obviously made old castellar fortifications nothing more than large, vulnerable 
targets easily reduced to rubble.  Fixed fortifications had to evolve:  advances in one set of 
weaponry or techniques […] quickly led to corresponding evolution in the other” (Downing 
1992, 67).  Cannons, and ports for their use, were added to existing structures for the purpose of 
counter-battery while fortifications were rebuilt in new structural designs that ‘countersunk’ 
buildings to make them more resistant to cannon fire and geometrically adjusted walls to make 
cannon fire from the fortress more effective (Parker 1996, 164).  Fortress building came to 
dominate the interwar periods in the late medieval age.  Smaller polities aimed at creating 
superfortresses impregnable against any and all external attacks while larger, more diffuse 
polities were forced to spend vast sums of capital on modernized walls and inter-city support 
structures to deal with the new reality of massive siege warfare.  Cities began to employ 
permanent, static artillery forces “consisting of one or several master cannoneers or artillers” 
whose only goal was the defense of fortified positions (Contamine 1984, 202).  The consequence 
of this broad period of defensive construction was to prolong wars virtually indefinitely as “in 
one region of Europe after another sieges eclipsed battles in importance and wars eternalized 
themselves” (Parker 1996, 167).  Decisive victory in field battle assumed far less strategic 
importance – only by controlling the fortresses could an invading force have any hope of 
maintaining control of the surrounding country. 
 Concurrent to these technological advances was the tactical advance away from mounted 
cavalry toward massed infantry.  While feudal knights were well trained and equipped, they were 
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also strongly individualistic and lacked discipline.  Arguing that they had sworn allegiance 
exclusively to the king, they often would refuse to take orders from any subsidiary officer.  
Similar problems existed among the peasant militias, which posed a dilemma for the ruling class:  
the necessity of their numbers in conflict abroad was balanced against their propensity to use 
their arms and training against local royal agents (Downing 1991, 61).  The development of the 
tight square formation of pikemen and its strategic use in anti-cavalry phalanxes, however, 
would render both of these modes of military organization ineffective and largely irrelevant.  The 
superiority in direct combat of these well-trained units of pikemen fundamentally altered the 
strategic balance in Europe, as polities with feudal militaries found themselves repeatedly on the 
losing side and subsequently switched away from the feudal military system toward infantry and 
artillery, the predominant strategic model to emerge from the Military Revolution (Downing 
1991, 63-4).  The dual necessity of more effective and more cost-efficient means of warfare 
drove leaders to adopt the infantry model, especially in conjunction with the purchase of large 
mobile artillery units.  
 The institutional consequences of the rapid transition to new technological and tactical 
modes of warfare were both massive and nearly immediate.  Over the course of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, leaders were forced to adapt to a mode of war that was fast, resource 
intensive, and extremely destructive.  The successive failures of the great powers of the high 
medieval period to win victories using their feudal militaries against rival infantries constituted 
by pikemen and nascent gunpowder artillery necessitated the complete dissolution of the feudal 
knighthood and the abandonment of ad-hoc structures of war.  The massive investment in 
artillery, especially in the example of France, represented a huge institutional shift in the military 
relations between competing states in Europe (Contamine 1984, 148-9).  Concomitantly, the vast 
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military expense of creating these new forms of military technology and organization, not to 
mention supplying the vast standing forces that siege warfare against multiple, hardened 
defensive positions demanded, provided a major difficulty for polities across Europe.  To the 
extent that political bodies were already in a position of economic profligacy, they could rely on 
mercenary forces and expensive defensive structures to sustain their social order, regardless of 
whatever limited territorial holdings they possessed.  For states lacking a competitive advantage 
in trade, however, new taxation structures and territorial grabs became inevitable.  To a certain 
extent, these expanding extractive structures constituted the fundamental institutional makeup of 
nascent sovereign states (Downing 1991, 120-1; Porter 1994, 66-7; Tilly 1992, 70-1).  Similarly, 
the very organizational institutions required to maintain large military forces created proto-statist 
relations, both in the structures needed to provide food and arms to military forces abroad and in 
the constitution of a military hierarchy to relay orders from the ruling social classes to the 
conscripted units participating in combat operations (Downing 1991, 13-4; Porter 1994, 67-8).  
The necessity of new institutional forms within the reconstituted warfighting paradigm 
fundamentally altered the mode of interaction both within and between European polities. 
 Changes in the systemic layer were no less meaningful.  The Military Revolution served 
both a deconstructive and reconstructive role in determining the balance of power across Europe.  
In its deconstructive capacity, the Military Revolution undermined the calcified institutional 
advantage massive polities like France and the Holy Roman Empire held during the high 
medieval period by undermining the role of feudal warfighting strategies.  The discipline and 
speed with which a military built around infantry and artillery could move and attack, not to 
mention the increased role of direct naval warfare, completely undermined the power base a 
feudal military and castellar defense could sustain.  Adding insult to injury, the traditional heavy 
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cavalry model was not only decimated in combat by the square pike formation, but it was a much 
less cost efficient model of military organization both in required training and in upkeep costs.  
Although it took a period of time for the depth of the military revolution’s consequences on 
systemic order to sink in, the old balance of power system died with the formal institution of 
infantry and gunpowder into warfighting (Downing 1991, 63).  In the reconstitution of the 
balance of power, those polities best able to provide for a large standing infantry, well-supplied 
mobile artillery, and fortification against modern siege technology gained a comparative 
advantage in warfare.  This shift encouraged polities able to maximize the relationship between 
coercion and capital, which privileged those political forms closest to the exclusive territorial 
sovereign (Porter 1994, 58; Tilly 1992, 27).  The competitive framework established in the new 
warfighting paradigm set a basic framework against which a new hegemonic order could, and in 
this instance did, arise. 
 
FEUDAL TRANSITION IN THE SOCIAL MODE OF WARFARE 
Beyond the surface-level technological and tactical transformations that altered the specific 
methods and practices constitutive of warfighting, the late feudal period witnessed a fundamental 
change in the social mode of warfare.  The medieval social mode of warfare, much like the 
corresponding form of political organization, was fragmented and cross-cutting, with actors 
claiming a variety of allegiances.  As Porter argues, from personal political relationships, to the 
nonexistence of taxation policy, and finally to the lack of any real sense of diplomacy or capital 
cities, the aphorism “all politics is local” quite literally attained meaning (Porter 1994, 25, 
emphasis in original).  This was especially true in warfare, where the means and resources of 
combat were held in private hands throughout a given kingdom or dynasty.  Military 
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organization also varied in form: from private armies, to city walls, to locally maintained 
fortresses, and finally to personal estates.  All of these forms of military hierarchy existed under 
an aristocratic patron, who styled himself part of a warrior class dedicated to the accumulation of 
a territorial power base (Porter 1994, 25-6).  Violent conflict in this sense was both more 
common and more spatially and destructively limited, mostly focused on local power-grabs and 
brief territorial skirmishes with rival kingdoms that usually didn’t amount to long-term conflict.  
What rudimentary forms of proto-sovereign administration existed in polities like France and 
England only subsisted insofar as the king possessed personal power.  There was almost no 
division between the personal military and financial holdings of the king and any public 
administrative capacity, which, if it existed at all, was merely an extension of a king’s patrimony 
(Porter 1994, 26). 
 Four fundamental alterations to the social fabric of Europe conspired to change this social 
mode of warfare in the late feudal period.  First, kings and dynasts fearful of the growing power 
of their Continental rivals acted to expand their territorial holdings, and subsumed smaller 
polities that had not made the transition to infantry and artillery.31  Rival powers often challenged 
this expansion, fearful of the consequences of massive imperial holdings in the hands of their 
adversaries—for example, France went to war with the Hapsburg dynasty to prevent domination 
of the Italian peninsula (Downing 1991, 65).  A second cause for warfare during this period were 
the so-called agrarian revolutions as the peasantry attempted to resist enclosure and restriction of 
the rights they had gained in the period following the Black Death.  Third, the crisis of the 
Reformation created warfare not only between polities, but within them as religious unity under 
a fixed Christendom gave way to fragmented religious identity and subsequent conflict (Porter 
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 Because of the uneven nature of military development across space, this social change assumes a staggered 
character.  Downing (1991, 64-5) discusses this territorial aggrandizement during the 16th and 17th centuries, while 
Black (1991, 82-4) discusses this transition in the context of late 18th and early 19th century Eastern Europe. 
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1994, 68-9).  Fourth and finally,32 trade disputes between states occasionally erupted into 
conflict, “though this was hardly the cause of as many wars as Marxist historians might suggest” 
(Downing 1991, 65).  The rise of all of these social and political fissures verifies Downing’s 
claim that during this period of constitutional crisis, war was much more common than peace.  
Each of these challenges reflected a threat to the social level of constitutive existence—territorial 
aggrandizement demonstrated a challenge to militaristic social relations, agrarian revolution 
established a challenge to the nature of social identity, the Reformation indicated a challenge to 
holistic religious identity, and trade war exhibited a tension in economic social relations.  All of 
these crises played out across Europe in different geopolitical configurations, but to some extent 
all of these concerns affected polities across the continent. 
 Despite the interlocking responses at the level of culture, trade, and politics, however, the 
specific modality in which these forms of social crisis played out across Europe was in a 
transformation in the social mode of warfare.  The inherently conflictual nature of all of these 
challenges required polities to build the practices and principles of modern warfare into the 
social fabric underpinning their rule.  In this way, the social mode of warfare moved from a role 
as just one constitutive social mode among many into the primary mode of societal thought and 
action.  Consequently, “armies became much larger, adopted new techniques and weaponry, and 
expanded central organization.  Warfare became an extremely onerous and politically sensitive 
fiscal burden” (Downing 1991, 65-66).  The most fundamental change to the social mode of 
warfare, however, dealt with the integration of a standing peacetime military force into societies 
across Europe.  Whereas before this transformation, warfare was situated at the level of private 
actors under the nominal feudal authority of a king or dynast, the increased economic and 
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 Downing (1991, 65) lists Turkish military pressure as a fifth catalyst for war, but it’s unclear how the Turkish role 
in European security relations changed between the High Middle Ages and the Late Middle Ages. 
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organizational costs of warfare necessitated the rise of a central authority to manage the 
increased social costs.  This new social mode of warfare surrounding an integrated, static 
military force immediately transformed the balance of power among European polities.   
As the French, Spanish and English monarchs began to organize centrally around a 
sustained and unified military force, a number of institutional benefits accrued to them that 
directly transformed the systemic balance of power.  First, logistical unification allowed common 
patterns of training and organization for pikemen, musketeers, and artillery forces to emerge.  
Cohesive training and establishment of a unified military doctrine allowed not only for standing 
forces to swell to massive sizes under emergent social hierarchy, but also for these forces to 
quickly conquer broad swaths of territory (Downing 1991, 69-70).  Each of the institutional 
transformations created a direct competitive advantage that allowed these polities to expand their 
territory while shoring up their borders.  Additionally, a standing army sustained internal order, 
because a centrally controlled military allowed the king or dynast to directly enforce societal 
codes against revolutionary impulses.  This in turn shored up collective social identity around a 
central organizing structure.  Through this process, the aristocracy surrendered their independent 
military forces to the central government in exchange for the title of officer in the king’s military 
(Porter 1994, 32-3).33  This fusion of public and private interests into the agency of corporate 
political organization allowed these polities to focus less on securing and maintaining order 
within their borders, and more on territorial expansion and the processes of modern warfare, 
giving them a direct increase in power relative to other regional governments. 
This social mode of warfare extended far beyond the social roles related directly to 
conflict and the hegemonic balance.  The king took special pride in maintaining his army during 
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 Interestingly, England took another 150 years after France and Spain to integrate the nobility into the officer corps 
and institute a standing army.  According to Porter (1994, 33) this stunted English land power and made the English 
Crown dependent on superior naval power and territorial discontinuity. 
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peacetime as both a source of personal pride and a demonstration of his leadership.  A clear 
indicator of the preeminent social role war came to play in post-feudal political organization can 
be seen in the practice of wearing military uniforms at court, encapsulating “the participation of 
the nobles in the service state, the systematization of the personal links binding nobilities and 
monarchs” (Black 1991, 89).  The identification of the polity with military decorum clearly 
indicates the pervasive role of military social doctrine in the fundamental system of political 
organization.  Here we see the birth of modern state practices, including corporate political 
identity as a sovereign, exclusive territorial control under a single ruler or bureaucratic apparatus, 
and the modes of taxation and individual subjectivity that are the fundamental building blocks of 
the modern sovereign state.  Elite cooperation should not be understood as the result of economic 
or religious social factors, which despite being major social considerations did not drive change.  
Instead, we should understand state identity formation as a consequence of the political attempt 
to externalize relations of violence outward by establishing a common military identity under the 
aegis of a new social mode of warfare (Porter 1994, 101-2).  The exogenous shock of persistent, 
fast, and deadly conflict throughout the continent drove the development of centralized, 
sovereign states best able to provide the financial and organizational wherewithal to survive 
(Downing 1991, 73; Parker 1996, 158-9; Porter 1994, 64-65, 72-73).34  Constitutive change in 
the social mode of war towards unified military identity in a standing force directly underpinned 
the subsequent transformation towards the unified sovereign-territorial state that predominates 
today. 
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 Black (1991, 67-8) argues that the relationship between warfare and state formation is reversed, with large 
territorial holdings demanding transformations in warfare.  While this argument can account for structural and 
tactical changes, however, it does not account for the constitutive role of technological innovation on the very nature 
of warfare and political organization. 
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MODERN TRANSITION IN THE WARFIGHTING PARADIGM 
In a similar fashion to the transition from feudal forms of military and political organization to 
centralizing, standing military forces and the sovereign-territorial state system, the modern world 
also appears to be undergoing fundamental transformation in warfare and political organization.  
Latham illustrates the changes reflected in the modern warfighting paradigm through the 
example of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the “transition from the mechanized 
‘manoeuvre warfare’ warfighting paradigm that evolved out of the World War II experience to a 
new paradigm based on ‘non-linear’ combat operations, ‘information warfare’ and ‘precision 
destruction’” (Latham 2002, 237).  This description of a doctrinal shift, however, is specific to 
the ideational context of what Shaw describes as the “New Western Way of War”, in which the 
Western bloc has moved towards a mode of ‘risk-transfer war’ (Shaw 2003, 2005).  These wars 
aim to reduce danger to civilian populations and Western forces by implementing increasingly 
precise targeting and employing fighting techniques aimed at maximizing efficiency and 
minimizing allied deaths.  As Shaw acknowledges in his most recent work on the question, 
however, the warfighting paradigm that risk-transfer war suggests is being increasingly 
challenged by the actual conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Shaw 2005, 93).  
The practice of warfare in these contexts poses a constitutional problem for the Western 
warfighting paradigm – in the same way that feudal military organization was ineffective in its 
response to the rapidity and destructiveness of infantry and artillery-based warfare, so too are 
conventional Western preponderance strategies confounded by the proliferation of cheap arms 
and their distribution throughout enemy populations. 
Instead of focusing on the way the West has transformed its particular mode of war 
towards precision bombing and “rapidly configurable ‘virtual task forces’” as Latham and Shaw 
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do, I am more interested in the broader transformation of military technology towards a global 
market of cheap and effective weaponry (Latham 2002, 10).  While traditional accounts of the 
transformation in military technology assume the development of weaponry necessarily leads to 
more and more destructive yields, a path leading directly from the ‘slingshot to the megaton 
bomb’,  more recent accounts note a break in this continuity contemporaneous to the 
development of nuclear weapons (Adorno in Deudney 2007, 27).  As the costs of war became 
too high to encourage direct great power conflict, war was increasingly subcontracted to proxies 
on the margins of superpower influence (Kahaner 2007, 5).  A critical military technological 
development driving this new wave of conflict was the 1947 invention of the standardized and 
mass produced AK-47 rifle by Avtomat Kalashnikov.   A weapon so cheap that in many 
countries one can be purchased for less than the price of a live chicken, the AK rifle kills more 
than a quarter of a million people annually and is the cornerstone of over 50 professional 
militaries, not to mention the weapon of choice for gang members and insurgents worldwide 
(Kahaner 2007, 2).  Michael Klare recently went so far as to argue that “’the most deadly combat 
system of the current epoch’ is ‘the adolescent human male equipped with a Kalashnikov’” 
(Klare in Faltas 2001, 397).  Similar evolution toward the battlefield employment of crude, low-
yield military technology can be seen in the widespread deployment of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), which to a great extent neutralize the advantage of a mobile infantry through 
inexpensive, often undetectable shaped explosives.  Because counter-measures are often 
confounded by cheap alterations to the IED model, these explosive devices pose a major threat to 
troop transports and tanks operating throughout active battlefields. 35 
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 The use of IEDs is a fairly recent phenomenon, beginning with the conflicts in Lebanon and Chechnya, and 
reaching widespread implementation in ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  See Cohen (2007, 154) and 
Steven and Gunaratna (2004, 50-54). 
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Small arms and munitions provide a number of tactical advantages for forces employing 
them.  First, they’re cheap, plentiful, and easy to produce.  Even if the production of these 
weapons were to end completely within the week, eighty to one hundred million of the guns have 
been produced since their inception and millions of them still freely circulate, moving from hot 
spot to hot spot (Faltas 2001, 398).  The weapons themselves are extremely durable and 
effective, with few moving parts making them resilient to jamming, their solid construction 
providing resistance to heat, cold, sand and rain, and their clip supporting a steady firing pace of 
600 rounds per minute.  Kahaner gives the anecdotal account of American GIs who found AKs 
buried in rice paddies for periods of six months or more that were filthy and rusted shut yet still 
fired perfectly when the action bolt was kicked (Kahaner 2007, 3).  The weapons are simple to 
both operate and maintain, allowing children and women to use them with as little as an 
afternoon of preparation (Faltas 2001, 398).  This directly transformed the conduct of military 
operations, with an increasing number of battlefield participants being both under the age of 18 
and ‘irregular’ combatants, not adopting any uniform or consistent rules of engagement.  Finally, 
these weapons can be dismantled into small parts and easily concealed or transferred, which 
allows for the easy circumvention of arms embargoes (Klare 1999, 13-4).  IEDs have similar 
operational advantages, insofar as the training required to build and handle explosives is 
relatively limited and knowledge on how to manufacture such munitions is freely available via 
the Internet (Steven and Gunaratna 2004, 50).  Additionally, the relative crudeness of the 
weapons makes their detection difficult, and insurgent groups have a combination of fake 
devices and secondary explosions aimed at bomb squads to deter their detection and removal 
(Bacevich 2008, 157-9). 
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The interactional consequences of this shift away from traditional preponderance 
strategies towards the cheap, distributed military power of small arms and explosives were both 
immediate and substantial.  War can no longer be seen as primarily conducted at the interstate 
level— powerful militaries armed with the most advanced air-, sea-, and land-based technology 
no longer represent the core of the warfighting paradigm.  Instead, the strategic focus of warfare 
has shifted away from direct military to military confrontation to dispersed, local, and high-
intensity conflicts.  The first major interactional shift can be seen in negotiating posture and 
policy.  Traditional channels of diplomacy and conflict resolution tend to be state-centric—that 
is, they presume the primacy of the state in modern warfighting, and consequently begin 
processes of conflict resolution by attempting to shore up the modern nation-state container.  
What such an approach ignores, however, is the massive breakdown of the state military model 
globally towards a heterogeny of public and private military forms.36  As Herfried Münkler 
notes, the consequence of this de-statization process is to make “[l]ocal warlords and 
transregional entrepreneurs […] the main protagonists and profiteers” (Münkler 2005, 17).  If the 
goals of prior leadership groups entailed nation or state-building, these new leadership groups are 
primarily concerned with personal and organizational wealth and power aggrandizement.   
As a consequence of the increasingly internationalized nature of the war economy, 
conflicts are much less likely to burn themselves out and are instead perpetuated through the 
international black market trade of conflict resources.  Consequently, the mode of engagement 
by Western and international forces becomes less one of diplomacy and more one of necessary 
intervention to end the threat to the economic and political interests of peacetime polities posed 
by refugee flows and illegal commerce (Münkler 2005, 127).  This very mode of intervention, 
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 Kaldor (2007, 97-101) describes five groups of militants operating worldwide:  regular armed forces, paramilitary 
groups, self-defense units, foreign mercenaries, and foreign regular troops under international auspices. 
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however, undermines the state’s claim to exclusive territorial sovereignty.  The move to 
asymmetrical warfighting, consequently, has caused a similar shift in interactional techniques—
no longer can international law be considered a reciprocal basis for interaction in the global 
political order.  It has yet to be seen whether international law will be reformed or abandoned; 
nevertheless, this new asymmetrical warfighting paradigm has instituted similar asymmetries in 
global political economy that are forcing wholesale interactional transformation (Münkler 2005, 
135). 
The shift in the tactical and technological dimensions of war, beyond merely changing 
interactional structures and strategies, has also altered the systemic balance of the international 
system.  Whereas traditional modes of contemporary warfare emphasized bringing maximal 
force to bear on an enemy in a show of overwhelming strength, such a warfighting strategy is 
unable to account for militants who don’t fight under the aegis of formal military structure 
(Kaldor 2007, 137-8).  Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the two phases of the 
2003 Iraq War.  In the first phase, where the United States engaged a similarly constituted 
military force in the Iraqi National Guard, technological superiority allowed for a rapid victory in 
a conventional sense.  Not only was Baghdad was captured, but the scope and the scale of the 
military operation throughout Iraq led the Army’s vice chief of staff to proclaim that the “speed 
of the advance was so dramatic that it unhinged the enemy” (Bacevich 2008, 157).  Military 
rationale, working from the tenets of RMA strategic thought, argued that speed and technological 
efficiency rendered massive troop infrastructure unnecessary.  The technologically sophisticated 
array of tanks, helicopters, and bombers allowed the United States to dismantle Iraq’s formal 
military apparatus in a matter of weeks.  It was in the second phase of combat operations, 
however, that the systemic weakness of this technological approach vis-à-vis low-budget 
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guerrilla warfare conducted with small arms and munitions became readily apparent.  Military 
technology built for large-scale conventional operations, including tanks and bombers, was 
virtually irrelevant to the urban and dissociated warfare that came to characterize the ongoing 
operations.  The concentrated use of AK-47 fire substantially limited the ability of the United 
States to fly Apache helicopters on support missions (Kahaner 2007 1-2).  Even the speed that 
the military relied on to quickly take control of the country became a viability, as the widespread 
use of IEDs allowed insurgent groups to become more agile than US forces tethered to bases and 
a network of secure roads connecting them (Bacevich 2008, 159).  While there have been some 
improvements on the strategic warfighting model employed by the United States and its allies 
since the beginning of combat operations in Iraq, the pervasive influence of small arms and 
guerrilla tactics demonstrates the limit of US hegemony and has revealed the potential for a 
hegemonic shift. 
 
MODERN TRANSITION IN THE SOCIAL MODE OF WARFARE 
No less important than changes in the way we conduct war are changes in the way we socially 
relate to war.  In a similar fashion to the social transition from the dissociative practices of 
warfare to the highly regimented, state-based warfare seen during the feudal-modern transition, 
the modality of war in the contemporary era seems to be moving from central authority to 
decentralized, identity-based warfare.  Latham isolates two episodes from this conjunctural 
viewpoint occurring in the early and late twentieth century—namely, ‘Industrialized Total 
Warfare’ and “a conjuncture variously labeled ‘Information Warfare’ (Shaw, 1991: 20), 
‘Spectator-Sport Warfare’ (McInnes, 1999), ‘Post-Heroic Warfare’ (Luttwak, 1995), ‘Virtuous 
War’ (Der Derian, 2001) and even (though, I would argue, erroneously), ‘Postmodern Warfare’ 
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(Gray, 1997)” (Latham 2002, 241).  ‘Industrialized Total Warfare’, roughly constituting the 
period from the beginning of World War I to the end of World War II, organized society around 
the three motivating concepts of mass destruction, mass mobilization, and mass production.  This 
move towards maximal production and dedication to the war effort began to fuse the ‘fighting 
front’ and the ‘home front’ into a coherent organizational entity.  The strategic implications of 
such a move were two-fold.  First, states best able to maximize this socio-military nexus were 
given a vast strategic advantage in the mobilization of both personnel and material.  Second, this 
form of warfare necessitated and enabled massive, increasingly destructive attacks on enemy 
homelands to destroy their productive capacity (Shaw 1991, 21).  As society and the war effort 
merged, the line between civilian and soldier blurred to the extent that massive bombing 
operations on civilian populations occurred throughout World War II.  The ultimate aim of war 
during this conjuncture was to inflict costs too severe for an enemy to bear.  The logic of mass 
destruction governed societal organization (Latham 2002, 242-3). 
 At the close of World War II, however, a number of factors converged to make continued 
reliance on the total warfare model untenable.  First, the nuclear revolution made the costs of 
full-scale war too high for anyone to bear, risking the extinction of humanity itself.  Second, the 
costs of major war in terms of both capital and human life exceeded the benefits from engaging 
in full-scale warfare.  Finally, the shift away from the massively mobilized armies of the past to 
more flexible, segmented, and professionalized military forces rendered tactics of mobilization 
largely anachronistic.  The central mobilizing principle of warfare became precise, targeted 
operations aimed at military targets.  The goal of military operations focused less on mass 
destruction and more on the ability to “paralyze and cripple the enemy” (Latham 2002, 243-5).  
Warfare, as socially constituted, became much less of a lived experience and more of a ‘spectator 
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sport’.  “While elements of continuity can be identified, it is clear that by the 1990s the world’s 
dominant social mode of warfare (i.e. the mode of warfare prevailing in the most advanced 
military powers) had evolved to the point where it was qualitatively different from that which 
prevailed during the era of Industrialized Total Warfare” (Latham 2002, 247). 
 This specific social configuration of warfare, however, cannot and should not be 
characterized as global.  During the same conjunctural period of transition Latham describes 
between Industrialized Total Warfare and Spectator Sport Warfare (or whichever of the modern 
descriptors you prefer), a contemporaneous social transition was occurring at the margins of 
Cold War bipolarity.  In the proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, the 
‘clients’ being trained and supplied were often not a state military, but a particular oppositional 
identity group who used this emergent ‘war economy’ to form a coherent war footing.  So long 
as they fought against the other bloc, their patron was happy, but in truth these groups were 
fighting for their constituted interests.  This distinction is critical.  In the rise of these 
oppositional identity groups we see the seeds of what Kaldor describes as the social organization 
of new wars around identity politics (Kaldor 2007, 82-3).  Especially in the wake of the Cold 
War, the fissures in state political power and the opening of transnational economic and military 
spaces has allowed for the proliferation of identity groups challenging the local monopoly on 
violence.  This fragmented, cross-cutting identity has recreated the social mode of warfare 
toward a logic of antagonistic relations between competing economic, national, religious, and 
political networks (Duffield 2001, 190). 
 As processes of increasing economic interconnection worldwide have opened the ability 
for goods and services to be widely distributed, they simultaneously opened channels for the 
creation of a ‘parallel economy’ in which “networks of corruption, black marketers, arms and 
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drug traffickers” can operate and establish a basis for social life outside of the state and the 
market (Kaldor 2007, 87).  This parallel economic model allows identity groups to form both a 
parallel political economy and a parallel war economy that can drive long-term military 
operations against a state and create pockets of anarchy within territorial order.  Money flowing 
in from state sponsors, direct family remittances, diaspora communities and humanitarian 
assistance are directed toward the perpetuation of this parallel war economy, which is forced into 
(and often escalates) direct conflict with state and international military authority (Kaldor 2007, 
109-110).  The result is perpetual conditions of warfare between cross-cutting jurisdictional 
entities, each claiming political, economic, and most of all military independence. 
 The threat such transnational military networks pose to the traditional balance of power 
and systemic order cannot be overstated.  As was established in the previous section, state 
militaries are often unable to deal with the realities of new methods and techniques of warfare 
that don’t emphasize a strong central military.  As these modes of warfare expand and become 
part of a larger movement creating new forms of socio-military organization, the challenges 
faced by traditional powers within international order become more perplexing.  As Philip Cerny 
argues concerning the effect of globalized warfare: “superpowers became weaker in systemic 
terms […] because traditional forms of power could not cope with the globalizing challenges of 
the late-twentieth-century international order” (Cerny 2005, 16).  The balance of power between 
states on both a regional and global scale depends in large part on their ability to maintain 
sovereign authority over their territorial holdings.  Consequently, legitimation crises undermine 
states’ ability to project power or maintain relative power vis-à-vis their neighbors and rivals.  
The rise of new wars makes static predictions based on the standard neorealist capabilities 
agenda incoherent.  If from one day to the next it is virtually impossible to understand the 
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constitution of military and economic relations through and across states because of the sheer 
preponderance of identity groups, it consequently becomes virtually impossible to ascertain a 
stable balance of power between states. 
 Posing an even more foundational problem for states, however, is the fact that these 
identity-based conflicts reveal the possibility of state sovereignty unspooling altogether.  State 
attempts to deal with and combat new wars reflect the weakness “to ‘defection’ as the game 
players say—to players quitting the game and heading off on their own” (Cerny 2005, 17).  The 
systemic response of the state system to its failures has been a fragmentation into a variety of 
potential remedies with no concerted action.  Instead of addressing the constitutional factors that 
are driving identity-based conflict and de-emphasizing traditional state sovereignty, states have 
instead taken defensive actions that have driven backlash against the order itself, resulting in a 
downward spiral of violence of which terrorism can be understood as one factor among many.  
In response to this breakdown, Kaldor calls for solidarity among “cosmopolitan islands” around 
principles of humanism and mutual acceptance of difference (Kaldor 2007, 187-190).  Such a 
project, however, seems to run in the face of the constituted nature of social relations as 
increasingly violent and conflictual.   
While it is difficult to see the emerging successor to political order from within the 
processes of social and political change, Philip Cerny’s neomedievalism hypothesis provides an 
well-theorized narrative for the reconstitution of the international system around transnational 
order.37  Similar to the feudal constitution of politics, Cerny argues that we are likely to see the 
reemergence of competing and overlapping jurisdictional claims, each exercising some degree of 
authority.  States are likely to lose both their territorial holism and their position of economic and 
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 In his most recent article, Cerny describes the phenomenon as “tangled hierarchy” (Cerny 2006, 693).  For a more 
detailed account of the neomedieval order, see Cerny (1998; 2005).  Early versions of this thesis for change in 
political organization can be seen in Cerny (1990; 1996).  
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political preeminence in international order, becoming instead “‘postfeudal residential 
aristocracies’ in a more and more globally integrated capitalist environment” (Cerny 2005, 21).  
Consequently, we should expect the rise of multiple competing institutions and the construction 
of identity across social, economic and political lines.  Structural fault lines will move away from 
territorial borders toward broader spheres of authority.  The result will be the creation of ‘durable 
disorder’—although divisions and violent conflict will remain constitutive factors worldwide, the 
flexibility of the broader neomedieval system allows for limited gains and should prevent the 
outbreak of chaos (Cerny 2005, 29-30).  While the neomedieval prediction is certainly not rosy, 
and treats violence and insecurity as constitutive political factors, it offers a nuanced predictive 
account of a world transitioning beyond the state system to transnational political order. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By drawing connections between military and political transitions in the feudal and modern 
cases, I have attempted to focus on the continuities and discontinuities between these 
transformations across both time and space.  In the feudal case, I began with an analysis of 
change in the warfighting paradigm and its effect on political organization.  First, I illustrated the 
three technological innovations (the capital naval vessel and its broadside, the use of gunpowder 
weaponry, and the development of the artillery fortress) and the main tactical innovation (the 
implementation of the pike and massed infantry formations) that occurred during the Military 
Revolution.  Within the same temporal frame, I argued that the necessary change these 
warfighting innovations entailed was an immediate shift in both the offensive and defensive 
practices of polities.  As warfighting became simultaneously more rapid and more dangerous to 
their more limited holdings, the interactions between comparatively weaker lords and their 
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shielding sovereign became more reified.  Similarly, the abandonment of the dispersed feudal 
knighthood in favor of fast military tactics necessitated international relations to focus more 
heavily on establishing official channels to pursue war and sue for peace.  Following the 
principles of upward causation, I argued that the change in the warfighting paradigm was a 
permissive change enabling major shifts in the balance of power among medieval polities.  
Those powers able to mobilize vast resources and manpower around the new techniques of war 
ascended while traditional medieval powers unable to adapt to the changes in the warfighting 
paradigm declined.  Moving to an examination of change in the social mode of warfare, I 
examined the move towards enshrining and centralizing the institution of warfare under as the 
essential organizing principle in society.  This took place through a centralization of military 
authority under a single dynast or sovereign, and entailed feudal lords giving up their social 
status as warrior chiefs in exchange for subsidiary officer positions in the service of the king’s 
military.  This corporatization of military identity directly transformed international order at the 
systemic level, greatly reducing the problem of internal conflict and allowing polities to focus on 
territorial defense and aggrandizement as the primary mode of warfare.  Finally, I argued that the 
social transformation in the conduct of feudal warfare was a permissive change that allowed for 
fundamental systems change.  As military structures under a single sovereign created processes 
of integration, bureaucratic innovations sprang up allowing for the king to move past his role as 
central military leader and assert greater and greater control over the polity as a whole.  The 
institution of military hierarchy, consequently, founded the institution of hierarchical sovereign 
relations throughout what quickly became a politically unified territorial holding. 
 In the modern case, I illustrated the fundamental shift in the warfighting paradigm 
embodied by the evolution and global distribution of cheap munitions and durable firearms, 
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which reversed the upward direction in costs required to maintain a meaningful military 
capability since the Military Revolution, and the tactical shift toward guerrilla and insurgent 
military tactics, which altered the fundamental method of battlefield engagement.  I argued that 
this innovation demonstrated a necessary change toward complete transformation in interactional 
strategies, with an ineluctable shift away from the traditional means of state-to-state conflict and 
diplomacy towards the recognition of a heterogeny of military forces.  This in turn transformed 
the mode of military intervention and conflict resolution downward against the emphasis on 
maintaining a nation-state container.  This technological innovation also represented a 
permissive change in hegemonic military relations, not only in the balance between constituted 
military powers, in which advanced, conventional Western militaries declined because their 
strategic superiority was largely neutralized, but also in the balance of power between nation-
state militaries and sub-state actors, who were able to stymie the advance of Western militaries in 
conflicts including but not limited to Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq.  The social 
mode of warfare also transformed during this period, with conflict no longer an attempt to 
increase relative power for states and overarching political identities, but instead being fought in 
the name of sub-state, transnational identity groups.  These constituted military identity groups 
operate from parallel economies that use the framework of globalization to build a war economy 
through backchannel financial flows and the sale of resources gained in conflict.  The necessary 
change entailed by this new social mode of warfare was to fundamentally alter the systemic 
balance of power, with great powers being systemically undermined by actors who they could 
not target with traditional modes of military and economic power.  As the exclusive territorial 
nature of sovereignty increasingly came under fire, transformation in the social mode of war 
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represents a permissive change away from the state system towards devolving centers of 
authority and cross-cutting social identity. 
 The parallels across these two historical periods are striking.  While the impetus of the 
military revolution in the feudal transition was towards large, reified identities best able to 
provide comparative military advantage, the massive reduction in the cost of maintaining a 
competitive fighting force has begun the a modern process of devolving military and political 
authority to identity-based interests.  Such a transition can be read as an inverse mirror of the 
process of state formation—as the ability for sub-state actors to achieve massive personal and 
corporate gains through local military control increases, the political drive begins to move in a 
devolutionary rather than evolutionary direction.  As the average size of a polity begins to move 
downward instead of upward, the reinstitution of crosscutting, neomedieval boundaries between 
and across local interest groups becomes a definite possibility.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
If we accept, as Charles Tilly argued, that war made the state and the state made war, the 
fundamental question for academics, policy makers, and the citizenry at large is to take this 
‘why’ statement and figure out the ‘how’.  How can warfare be understood as a constitutive 
condition in human life and political organization?  How do we explain and typify change across 
broad periods of history and wide gulfs in political theory and practice?  It is my contention that 
only by linking the process of fundamental change in political organization back to prior 
transformations in the bedrock constitutive principles underpinning warfare that we can tease out 
a comprehensive account of the process of statization and the potential for de-statization.  Instead 
of treating this transformation as a unified narrative of political progress, in which history is 
reduced to the broad brushstrokes of teleology, we need to focus on how change occurs in and 
across different temporal modes.  The Braudelian method of dividing time into day-to-day, 
episodic, and epochal frames allows the reader of history to tease out the interlocking dimensions 
of change in warfare and how these shifts substantively effected transformation in political 
organization.  While this historical model cannot capture all of the uncertainty and openness that 
fundamental processes of transformation inevitably entail, it offers a vision of the world that 
emphasizes nuance and links change from the smallest levels of politics and warfighting to the 
grandest levels of polities and their policies. 
 The literature at large, while both broad and deep, suffers from three main conceptual 
difficulties.  First, to the extent that theories place weight on an underlying variable driving 
transformation, these accounts tend to reflect a deterministic bias.  From the ahistorical 
structuring principles of anarchy in conventional and radical realism, to the historically 
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questionable concept of a world-economy, to the democratic principles entailed in globality, all 
of these accounts overemphasize the transhistorical constancy of their driver and never account 
for changes to this essential variable across time and space.  Second, many theories describe the 
principles of change, but are unable to account for the constitutive drivers of such a 
transformation.  Some event within or crisis to the very foundations of political order is required 
to move away from centuries of accumulated history and policy.  The constructivist and 
commercialization models, however, provide no essential driver for change and are thus unable 
to tease out either how or why changes occur.  Finally, the theoretical corpus on the topic of 
change in political organization vastly underemphasizes the role of warfare in political 
transformation.  For most theoretical accounts war is a dependent variable determined by some 
external structure that cannot operate independently of politics.  Even the most nuanced accounts 
like Teschke’s social property relations model, which attempts to sneak war in as a property 
relation, or the geopolitical competition model, which ignores the social function of war 
completely, fall short on this account.   
 A theoretical model centered on a nuanced and contingent definition of warfare helps to 
rectify many of these theoretical shortcomings.  Where theories that assume a transhistorical 
basis for transformation usually focus on unchanging, ahistorically universal variables, a theory 
of war-driven change does not have any such determinacy.  While warfare itself, in the broad 
Clausewitzian sense of force to compel action by another, exists across time and space, its 
specific dimensions and instantiations are always in motion.  War as practiced in tactical, social, 
and historical senses is constantly in flux, changing with every new development across the 
various temporal registers.  Warfare in one region of the world at a given time is vastly different 
from war conducted either in different geographical or cultural settings or different epochs.  
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Second, where a broad cross-section of the literature on political transformation is unable to 
describe the antagonisms driving change, analytical discussion of warfare immediately gets to 
the heart of that question.  While the raison d’état behind war at any given time or place is a 
function of its historical, social, and tactical understandings of warfare, changes in the conduct 
and conception of war function as direct drivers in new forms of political evolution.  Finally, 
focusing on war as the bridge between ideational and material triggers for change allows students 
of history and politics to see warfare as something more than just an interruption of politics and a 
noisy clanging of polities.  Instead, warfare becomes a social practice, something that all political 
subjects play a part in both in thought and in action.  
Although it’s too early to draw any substantive conclusions about the end state of this 
political and military revolution, what seems clear is that change is occurring.  Consequently, the 
aim of scholars and policymakers alike should be to focus on the mechanisms of this change.  
Study of these processes of transformation is essential to understand the precise modalities and 
practices that are contributing to the rise of new wars and the fall of sovereign states.  My thesis 
represents an essential analytical step forward in this regard.  I have established a theoretical 
framework with a consistent ontological, epistemological, and methodological basis to study 
these processes of transformation across time, space and structure.  The places where my thesis 
is most limited—the depth of my case study and limitation to the dimensions of European and 
Western political transformation—are the precise areas in which the theoretical core of my 
argument provides a foundation for further inquiry.  Drawing connections between developments 
in warfare and political organization within the same temporal mode and in processes of upward 
causation will hopefully provide a method for further research that allows scholars of history and 
politics alike to tease out the contours of political transformation.  At the very least, I hope my 
105 
project provides knowledge and nuance to the questions of transformation in warfare and 
political organization, filling a gap that the predominant literature is unable to suture. 
Understanding transformation in political organization is vital to the academic and 
professional interests of a number of communities.  First, scholars of history, sociology and 
political science ought to examine the basis for the deeply constituted transitions that threaten to 
alter so much about the world academia attempts to explain, theorize and ultimately understand.  
A coherent theoretical approach is vital to the consistent application of evidence and analysis to 
processes of transformation.  Second, policymakers should focus on the conditions of systems 
change, especially insofar as the vague outline of a new global transition is beginning to emerge 
with simultaneous processes of institutional integration and disintegration occurring throughout 
the world.  Understanding the way transitions have operated historically can help inform action 
taken to address current processes of transition.  Finally, the citizenry at large ought to take a 
direct interest in this study, because the transformation of political order leaves no member of the 
global polis unaffected.  Fundamental transformative processes pose the possibility of major 
alterations to our day to day life, which makes the understanding of political transitions and 
discussion of potential end-states absolutely essential. 
106 
WORKS CITED 
Anderson, Perry.  Lineages of the Absolutist State.  London: NLB, 1974. 
Atzili, Boaz.  “The Virtues and Vices of Fixed Territorial Ownership.”  SAIS Review 27(2), 
2007, pp. 95-108. 
Bacevich, Andrew J.  The Limits of Power.  New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2008. 
Barkawi, Tarak.  Globalization and War.  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 
2006. 
Black, Jeremy.  A Military Revolution?  Military Change in European Society, 1550-1800.  
London: Macmillan, 1991. 
Bobbitt, Philip.  The Shield of Achilles:  War, Peace, and the Course of History.  New York: 
Knopf, 2002. 
Bodin, Jean.  Six Books of the Commonwealth, abridged and trans. by M.J. Tooley.  Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1955. 
Bonney, Richard.  “Introduction:  Economic Systems and State Finance”.  In Economic Systems 
and State Finance, edited by Richard Bonney.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 
Braudel, Fernand.  The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 
trans. by Sian Reynolds.  New York:  Harper and Row, 1972-1974. 
———.  On History, trans. by Sarah Matthews.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
———.  The Perspective of the World, volume 3, trans. Sian Reynolds.  Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992. 
———.  The History of Civilizations, trans. by Richard Mayne. New York: Penguin, 1993. 
Bukovansky, Mlada.  “National Collective Identity:  Social Constructs and International Systems 
by Rodney Bruce Hall.”  The American Political Science Review, 94(1), 2000, pp. 240-
241. 
Bull, Hedley.  The Anarchical Society:  A Study of Order in World Politics.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977. 
Cerny, Philip G.  The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future of the 
State.  London: Sage Publications, 1990. 
———.  “What Next for the State?”  In Globalization: Theory and Practice, edited by Eleonore 
Kofman and Gillian Youngs, pp. 123-137.  London: Pinter Publishers, 1996. 
107 
———.  “Neomedievalism, Civil War and the New Security Dilemma: Globalization as Durable 
Disorder”, Civil Wars, 1(1), 1998, pp. 36-64. 
———.   “Terrorism and the New Security Dilemma,” Naval War College Review, 58(1), 2005, 
pp. 11-33. 
———.  “Restructuring the state in a globalizing world:  capital accumulation, tangled 
hierarchies, and the search for a new spatio-temporal fix.”  Review of International 
Political Economy 13(4), 2006, pp. 679-695. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, and Bruce Podobnik.  “The Next World War:  World-System Cycles 
and Trends.” Journal of Worlds Systems Research 1(6), 1995, pp. 1-46. 
Clausewitz, Carl.  On War, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, edited by Beatrice Heuser.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Cohen, Eliot A.  “Technology and Warfare.”  In Strategy in the Contemporary World, Second 
Edition, edited by John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Eliot A. Cohen, and Colin S. Gray, pp. 
141-160.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Contamine, Philippe.  War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones.  Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1984. 
Cox, Robert with Timothy J. Sinclair.  Approaches to World Order.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996. 
Craig, Campbell.  “The Resurgent Idea of World Government.” Ethics and International Affairs 
22(2), 2008, pp. 133-142. 
Deudney, Daniel.  “Nuclear weapons and the waning of the real-state.”  Daedalus 124(2), 1995, 
pp. 209-231. 
———.  “Geopolitics and Change.” In New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited 
by Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, pp. 91-124.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1997. 
———.  Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village.  
Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2007. 
Downing, Brian M.  The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Early Modern Europe.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
Duffield, Mark.  Global Governance and the New Wars:  The Merging of Development and 
Security, Second Edition.  London:  Zed Books, 2001. 
108 
Ertman, Thomas.  Birth of the Leviathan:  Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Faltas, Sami.  “Small Arms—Big Problems.”  In Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, edited by Luc 
Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, pp. 397-404.  Boulder, CO:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2001. 
Foucault, Michel.  The Order of Things.  New York:  Random House, 1970. 
Fukuyama, Francis.  The End of History and the Last Man.  London:  Penguin Books, 1992. 
Gilpin, Robert.  War and Change in World Politics.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1983. 
Grotius, Hugo.  On the Law of War and Peace.  Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 
Haigh, Stephen Paul.  “Globalization and the Sovereign State: Authority and Territoriality 
Reconsidered.”  Refereed paper presented to the First Oceanic International Studies 
Conference, Australian National University, Canberra, July 14-16, 2004. 
Hall, Rodney B.  National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems.  
New York:  Columbia University Press, 1999. 
———.  “Dialectics as Constitutive Process in Historical International Systems: From ‘Concrete 
Totality’ to Context Sensitivity”.  Paper Presented at the Sixth Pan European 
International Relations Conference, Turino, Italy, September 12-15, 2007. 
Halliday, Fred.  Revolution and World Politics:  The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power.  
London: Macmillan, 1999. 
Harknett, Richard J.  “Territoriality in the Nuclear Era.”  In Globalization: Theory and Practice, 
edited by Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, pp. 138-149.  London: Pinter Publishers, 
1996.  
Herz, John.  “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State.” World Politics 9(4), 1957, pp. 473-493. 
Hobbes, Thomas.  Leviathan.  New York:  Penguin Books, 1985. 
Hobson, John M., and J.C. Sharman.  “The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: 
Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change,” European Journal of 
International Relations 11(1), 2005, pp. 63-98. 
Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith.  “A Response: Why Epistemology Matters in International 
Relations.”  Review of International Studies 22(1), 1996, pp. 111-116. 
109 
Kahaner, Larry.  AK-47: The Weapon that Changed the Face of War.  Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
& Sons, 2007. 
Kaldor, Mary. “Warfare and Capitalism.”  In Exterminism and Cold War, edited by New Left 
Review, London: Verso, pp. 261-288.  
———.  New and Old Wars: Second Edition.  Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007. 
Kaufman, Stuart J.  “The Fragmentation and Consolidation of International Systems.” 
International Organization 51(2), 1997, pp. 173-208. 
Klare, Michael T.  “The International Trade in Light Weapons: What Have We Learned?”  In 
Light Weapons and Civil Conflict:  Controlling the Tools of Violence, edited by Jeffrey 
Boutwell and Michael T. Klare, pp. 9-28.  Lanham, MD:  Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1999. 
Kojeve, Alexandre.  Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, assembled by Raymond Queneau, 
edited by Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr.  Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1980. 
Krasner, Stephen D.  “Westphalia and All That”.  In Ideas and Foreign Policy:  Beliefs, 
Institutions, and Political Change.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 235-264. 
———.  “Compromising Westphalia”.  International Security 20(3), 1995, pp. 115-151. 
———.  Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich.  “Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the 
Formation of the State System,” World Politics 39(1), 1986, pp. 27-52. 
Latham, Andrew.  “Warfare Transformed:  A Braudelian Perspective on the ‘Revolution in 
Military Affairs.’”  European Journal of International Relations, 8(2), 2002, pp. 231-
266. 
———.  “The Transformation of War,” in Craig A. Snyder, ed., Contemporary Security and 
Strategy.  New York:  Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
LeBlanc, Steven A.  “Why Warfare?  Lessons from the Past.”  Daedalus 136(1), 2007, pp. 13-
21. 
Lebow, Richard Ned.  “Classical Realism,” in Timothy Dunne, Milja Kirki, and Steve Smith, 
ed., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007, pp. 52-70. 
110 
Lu, Catherine.  “World Government”.  In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by 
Edward N. Zalta.  Winter 2006 Edition.  Available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/world-government/. 
Mann, Michael.  The Sources of Social Power:  Vol. 1.  A History of Power from the Beginning 
to A.D. 1760.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
———.  “The Autonomous Power of the State:  Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results.” In 
States, War, and Capitalism:  Studies in Political Sociology, edited by Michael Mann.  
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988a, pp. 1-32. 
———.  “European Development:  Approaching a Historical Explanation.”  In Europe and the 
Rise of Capitalism, edited by Jean Baechler, John A. Hall, and Michael Mann.  Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1988b, pp. 73-123. 
Mansbach, Richard W.  “In Search of the Real State.”  International Studies Review 6, 2004, pp. 
315-317. 
Mearshimer, John.  The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.  New York:  W.W. Norton and 
Company, 2001. 
———.  "Structural Realism," in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 
editors Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007, pp. 71-88. 
Münkler, Herfried.  The New Wars, trans. Patrick Camiler.  Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2005. 
Onuf, Nicholas.  World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations.  Columbia, SC:  University of South Carolina Press, 1989. 
Parker, Geoffrey.  The Military Revolution:  Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-
1800, Second Edition.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Parkin, Frank.  Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique.  New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1979. 
Porter, Bruce D.  War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics. 
New York: Free Press, 1994. 
Reus-Smit, Christian.  The Moral Purpose of the State:  Culture, Social Identity and Institutional 
Rationality in International Relations.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1999. 
Roberts, Michael.  The Military Revolution, 1560-1660.  Belfast:  Queen’s University Press, 
1956. 
111 
Robinson, William I.  “Theory of the Global State:  Globality as an Unfinished Revolution by 
Martin Shaw.”  The American Political Science Review, 95(4), 2001. 
Rogers, Clifford J.  “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War.”  In The Military 
Revolution Debate:  Readings on the Military Transformation in Early Modern Europe, 
edited by Clifford J. Rogers, pp. 55-94.  Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
Rosenberg, Justin.  Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International 
Relations. London: Verso, 1994. 
———.  “Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem”.  International Politics, 42, 2005, pp. 2-74. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques.  The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston.  New York: Penguin 
Classics, 1968. 
Ruggie, John.  “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity:  Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis.” In Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Robert Keohane.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986. 
———.  “Territoriality and Beyond:  Problematizing Modernity in International Relations.” 
International Organization 47(1), 1993, pp. 139-174. 
———.  Constructing the World Polity:  Essays on International Institutionalization.  New 
York: Routledge, 1998a. 
———.  “What Makes the World Hang Together?  Neo-Utilitarianism and Social Constructivist 
Challenge.” International Organization, 52(4), 1998b, pp. 855-885. 
Skocpol, Theda.  States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and 
China.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
Shaw, Martin.  Dialectics of War: An Essay in the Social Theory of Total War and Peace.  
London: Pluto Publishing, 1988. 
———.  “War and the Nation State”.  In The Social Theory of Modern Societies:  Anthony 
Giddens and his Critics, edited by David Held and John B. Thompson, pp. 129-146.  
Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
———.  Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution.  London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000a. 
———.  “War and Globality: The Role and Character of War in the Global Transition.”  Paper 
presented at CERI Conference ‘La Guerre Entre Le Local Et Le Global:  Societes, Etets, 
Systemes’, May 29-30, 2000b. 
112 
———.  “The Unfinished Global Revolution:  Intellectuals and the New Politics of International 
Relations.”  Review of International Studies, 27(4), 2001, pp. 627-647. 
———.  War and Genocide:  Organized Killing in Modern Society.  Malden, MA:  Blackwell 
Publishing Inc., 2003. 
———.  The New Western Way of War:  Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq.  Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2005. 
Silver, Brian L.  The Ascent of Science.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Spruyt, Hendrik.  The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer.  “The Moral Purpose of the State:  Culture Social Identity, and 
Institutional Rationality in International Relations by Christian Reus-Smit.”  The 
American Political Science Review, 95(1), 2001, pp. 264-265. 
Steven, Graeme C.S. and Rohan Gunaratna.  Counterterrorism: A Reference Handbook.  Santa 
Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2004. 
Taylor, Peter J. “The Modern Multiplicity of States.” In Globalization: Theory and Practice, 
edited by Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, pp. 99-108.  London: Pinter Publishers, 
1996. 
Teschke, Benno.  The Myth of 1648:  Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern 
International Relations.  London: Verso, 2003. 
Tilly, Charles.  Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992. Cambridge, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 1992. 
Van Creveld, Martin.  Technology and War.  Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991a. 
———.  The Transformation of War.  New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991b. 
———. The Rise and Decline of the State.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
Villacres, Edward J. and Christopher Bassford.  “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity.”  
Parameters 25(3), 1995, pp. 9-19. 
Walker, Greg.  Writing Under Tyranny:  English Literature and the Henrician Reformation.  
Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel.  World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction.  Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2004. 
Waltz, Kenneth.  Theory of International Politics.  Reading, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1979. 
113 
———.  “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1990, 
pp. 21-37. 
Wendt, Alexander.  “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”. 
International Organization, 41(3), 1987, pp. 335-370. 
———.  “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. 
International Organization, 46(2), 1992, pp. 391-425. 
———.  Social Theory of International Politics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
———.  “Why a World State is Inevitable”.  European Journal of International Relations 9(4), 
2003, pp. 491-542. 
———.  “Agency, Teleology and the World State:  A Reply to Shannon”.  European Journal of 
International Relations 11(4), 2005, pp. 589-598. 
Xenias, Anastasia.  “Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global 
Village by Daniel H. Deudney”.  Political Science Quarterly 122(4), 2007, pp. 697-99. 
 
